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Abstract 
In this paper, I investigate whether accounting conservatism, or asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings, contributes to the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. Earnings that incorporate 
losses in a timely manner inevitably produce transitory losses; the losses may improve 
incentives in a variety of contracts, but assessing stock value is complicated when 
earnings include both persistent and transitory components. One possible way for 
companies facing high contracting costs to balance contracting efficiency and equity 
valuation considerations is to report conservatively while providing additional 
information about transitory items via the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. I 
hypothesize and test whether the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings is particularly 
prevalent in the presence of timely loss recognition and an elevated focus on equity 
valuation arising from equity offerings or CEO equity compensation/ownership. Results 
in my study show a greater propensity of sample firms to report non-GAAP earnings 
around the time of stock offerings in certain circumstances, but CEO stock compensation 
or ownership does not seem to motivate the use of non-GAAP earnings.  Finally, firms 
with more conservative reporting are not more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings. 
Findings of my study lend little support for the conjecture that non-GAAP earnings are 
used to inform investors of transitory earnings components from timely loss recognition.
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Despite more stringent regulations set forth in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the use of 
non-GAAP earnings did not disappear after Regulation G. For example, Google began 
disclosing non-GAAP diluted EPS in October 2005. On the company’s blog, Chief 
Accountant Mark Fuchs explained that “…because Wall Street analysts typically estimate 
and describe our results with non-GAAP EPS numbers, that resulted in some confusing 
apples-to-oranges analyses of our results. (By the way, we review non-GAAP results 
when we analyze our own performance.)”.1 Empirical evidence to date does not provide 
unambiguous conclusions about the motives for disclosing non-GAAP earnings. The 
literature on non-GAAP earnings disclosure shows that markets find non-GAAP earnings 
useful, but evidence consistent with opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings also exists 
(Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Brown and Sivakumar 2003; 
Bowen et al. 2005; Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Black and Christensen 2009).  
Accounting conservatism has become a topic that interests many researchers in 
recent years. In spite of the rapid growth in this literature, to date our knowledge of the 
determinants and effects of conservatism is still limited. Although the FASB discourages 
both upward and downward bias in financial reporting, a growing number of studies 
report evidence consistent with the proposition that conservatism originates from the 
demand of companies to improve the efficiency of various contracts and to reduce taxes, 
regulatory costs, and litigation risks. In this study, I attempt to extend the literature on 
both non-GAAP earnings disclosure and accounting conservatism by examining whether 
                                                            
1 Source: “Financial Reporting: The Alphabet Soup”, entry posted on the Official Google Blog 
(http://googleblog.blogspot.com) by Mark Fuchs on October 13, 2005. 
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accounting conservatism contributes to the use of non-GAAP earnings under certain 
conditions. 
 Because reported GAAP earnings are used for various contracts, companies 
facing high contracting costs may report conservatively to increase the efficiency of their 
contracts. For example, by recognizing losses on a timelier basis than gains, conservatism 
can reduce the likelihood of rewarding management for unrealized gains that do not 
eventually materialize (Leone et al. 2006). Conservatism is also reported to be associated 
with lower cost of debt (Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; Zhang 2008).  
However, timely recognition of losses but not gains can create a dilemma for 
companies that want both efficient contracts and accurate equity valuation. This form of 
conservatism records a loss today for anticipated future bad news.  For example, consider 
a company with a long-term contract to sell products at a fixed price; if market conditions 
change so that future cost of sales will exceed the selling price, the company records a 
current period loss for all of the future expected losses. If such losses are recorded in an 
impartial manner, the current period loss should reflect all available bad news and 
therefore will not persist into the future.  The lack of persistence differs from other 
sources of earnings, as prior research indicates that on average, current-period earnings 
components tend to persist into the future (Kormendi and Lipe 1987). Thus the dilemma 
— how can the company be sure that investors appreciate the lower persistence when the 
company records a conservative loss?  Such companies may use additional disclosure to 
illustrate the transitory nature of losses from practicing conservatism, and non-GAAP 
earnings that exclude transitory items allow managers to demonstrate the persistent 
versus transitory components of earnings.  
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In this paper, I examine the reporting of non-GAAP earnings, or pro forma 
earnings, to see whether the concurrent existence of accounting conservatism and a 
strong focus on equity valuation spurs the use of pro forma earnings. Because earnings 
contain transitory items at times, managers with a strong focus on equity valuation may 
wish to report non-GAAP earnings to inform investors of the existence of transitory 
items. I measure the strength of focus on equity valuation using the propensity to access 
equity markets and three variables that capture different aspects of how CEO’s wealth is 
affected by changes in stock price. Furthermore, conditional conservatism, which implies 
recording losses, but not gains, on a timely basis, by definition results in transitory losses. 
Therefore I expect to find even greater use of non-GAAP earnings among companies that 
report conservatively but also have a strong focus on valuation. I use the firm-year 
measure of conditional conservatism, C_SCORE, to capture the differential timeliness of 
loss recognition among companies. I also test whether conservatism has any stand-alone 
effect on the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings.  
The main findings of my study are as follows. Results of my paper indicate a 
higher propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings of sample firms around stock offerings, 
but do not support a link between equity compensation or ownership of CEOs and the use 
of non-GAAP earnings. Although timely loss recognition produces transitory items in 
earnings, the propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings does not increase with the level 
of conservatism even among companies with recent equity offerings. I also find no 
evidence that conservatism, in the absence of enhanced valuation concerns, plays any role 
in the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. Results are robust to several alternative 
measures of timely loss recognition and the alternative definition of non-GAAP earnings.  
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 My study contributes to the literature on the motives for the disclosure of non-
GAAP earnings. Lougee and Marquart (2004) find that non-GAAP earnings are more 
commonly used by companies with less informative GAAP earnings. A number of firm 
characteristics, such as low core earnings persistence, transitory items, or high risks can 
all produce low ERCs.  Hence, the finding of Lougee and Marquardt does not identify 
which factors that lower ERCs are influencing the decision to disclose non-GAAP 
earnings. As an extension of Lougee and Marquardt, this paper further investigates if 
conditional conservatism, which is known to produce transitory losses, can be a motive 
for using non-GAAP earnings to inform investors about the differential persistence of 
earnings components. However, I find no support for greater use of non-GAAP earnings 
even among companies whose financial reporting is known to produce transitory items. 
Findings in my study casts doubt on the claim that non-GAAP earnings are used to 
inform investors of transitory earnings components. 
In addition, my paper adds more evidence to the accounting conservatism 
literature. Recent studies bring up the question of whether companies that report more 
conservatively also exhibit unique disclosure behavior (Givoly et al. 2007; Hui et al. 
2009; Li 2008). Hui et al. and Li both examine the relation between management 
forecasts and conservatism and arrive at opposite conclusions. In this paper, I examine a 
different disclosure venue and find no relation between conservatism and the use of non-
GAAP earnings, implying that conservatism does not increase or decrease disclosure.  
 In the next chapter I discuss relevant literature, and state the hypotheses and 
research questions investigated in my study.  Details of the research design are described 
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in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 discusses the empirical results, and Chapter 5 concludes the 
paper. 
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Chapter 2 Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Equity Valuation and the Disclosure of Non-GAAP Earnings 
Various empirical and anecdotal evidence indicates that equity valuation is an 
important consideration in managers’ decisions to issue voluntary disclosure, as increased 
disclosure may help reduce information asymmetry and thereby generate benefits such as 
lowering the cost of capital or litigation risks (see Healy and Palepu 2001 for a 
comprehensive review). In the survey of CFOs of Fortune 500 companies by Graham et 
al. (2005), the majority of respondents concur that they would disclose additional 
financial information to increase the predictability of their companies’ future prospects or 
to correct undervaluation of their stock.  
One form of voluntary disclosure examined in prior studies is the disclosure of 
non-GAAP earnings, often referred to as pro forma earnings. The use of pro forma 
earnings has been controversial. Proponents of pro forma earnings believe that non-
GAAP numbers help financial statement users better understand the level of core 
earnings of the company, whereas critics fear that companies use pro forma earnings as a 
means of disguising poor performance to mislead investors. As a part of the regulatory 
reform set forth in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) 
adopted Regulation G in March 2003 to tighten the rules on the reporting of non-GAAP 
earnings. Regulation G mandates that when a public company provides material 
information that contains a non-GAAP financial measure, the company must 
concurrently provide the most comparable GAAP measure, as well as a reconciliation of 
the difference between non-GAAP earnings and the most comparable GAAP measure. In 
2009, the SEC brought the first enforcement action under Regulation G, charging 
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SafeNet, Inc. for classifying “ordinary operating expenses as non-recurring integration 
expenses” (U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 3068, November 12, 2009). The reporting of non-GAAP 
earnings remains an area of focus of the SEC despite the amount of time that has elapsed 
since the introduction of Regulation G.2   
Much debate concerns the motives behind pro forma earnings disclosure in the 
literature as well as in practice. Evidence exists for both informative as well as 
opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings. Several studies show that, compared to GAAP 
earnings, pro forma earnings are more value relevant and more likely to induce analyst 
forecast revisions (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Brown and 
Sivakumar 2003). These findings suggest that either non-GAAP earnings are indeed 
useful or markets are systematically “fooled” by the alternative earnings metrics. 
However, the latter explanation is not supported by prior studies (Lougee and Marquardt 
2004; Johnson and Schwartz 2005).  In addition, experimental research shows that 
professional investors do not naively take non-GAAP numbers reported by management 
at their face value (Frederickson and Miller 2004; Elliott 2006), indicating that market 
participants cannot all be fooled. 
On the other hand, the use of pro forma earnings looks biased in some cases 
(Bowen et al. 2005; Black and Christensen 2009; Brown et al. 2009). For example, 
Bowen et al. (2005) find that companies tend to emphasize the more favorable metrics. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2004) and Black and Christensen (2009) report a non-trivial number 
                                                            
2 According to a recent article on CFO.com, in a conference speech, Wayne Carnall, chief accountant for 
the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, listed non-GAAP disclosures as one of the areas to which the 
Commission will pay close attention (“What’s On the SEC’s Radar?” by Marie Leone. CFO.com. 
September 29, 2010). 
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of cases of firms excluding depreciation or stock compensation expenses that occur year 
after year as a part of ordinary operations. A number of papers also document notable 
changes in the use of non-GAAP earnings soon after Reg G became effective (Entwistle 
et al. 2006; Marques 2006; Yi 2007; Heflin and Hsu 2008; Kolev et al. 2008). 
Collectively, these findings suggest that at least some pro forma earnings are likely 
motivated by managerial opportunism.  
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that firms with less informative GAAP 
earnings (or smaller earnings response coefficients, hereafter ERCs) are more likely to 
report non-GAAP earnings. One contributing factor to smaller ERCs is the existence of 
transitory earnings components. Prior literature shows that earnings of differential 
persistence would receive different multiples (Lipe 1986; Kormendi and Lipe 1987). The 
computation of GAAP earnings will at times include transitory items, even for companies 
with generally highly informative GAAP earnings. In fiscal periods when transitory items 
are recorded, managers may wish to inform investors about the existence of these 
transitory items. The intent to inform investors about transitory items may explain why 
some companies report pro forma earnings lower than reported GAAP earnings, because 
failure to understand the transitory nature of a one-time gain can unduly raise market 
expectations for future performance, resulting in shareholder litigation (Healy and Palepu 
1993). 
The desire to help investors correctly assess the persistence of various earnings 
components should be stronger when managers are particularly concerned about the 
valuation of the company’s stock.  For example, managers can become increasingly 
concerned about equity valuation prior to equity financing transactions or when their 
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personal wealth varies with stock price (Healy and Palepu 1993, 1995, 2001). In other 
words, the enhanced focus on equity valuation can exacerbate the incentives to make 
additional disclosure in periods when transitory items occur. 
Increased disclosure can be accomplished via various mechanisms, such as 
increased discussions in mandatory reports, conference calls, management forecasts, and 
news releases. Those measures of disclosure examined in prior studies are summarized in 
Appendix 1. In this paper, I examine the disclosure of pro forma earnings because, 
compared to other forms of voluntary disclosure, pro forma earnings are perhaps the most 
direct way to illustrate to investors the recurring level of earnings by removing transitory 
items from GAAP earnings.3  My first hypothesis therefore predicts that managers who 
have a stronger focus on equity valuation and thus wish to inform investors about 
differential persistence of earnings components will likely disclose alternative non-
GAAP measures. 
 
H1: The propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings increases in the strength of 
managers’ focus on equity valuation. 
  
2.2 Conservatism and Contracting Efficiency 
  Basu (1997) defines conservatism as “…capturing accountants’ tendency to 
require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad news in 
                                                            
3 Management forecasts of non-GAAP earnings issued shortly before the announcement of the actual 
outcome can also have similar effects.  However, not all management forecasts are based on non-GAAP 
earnings. Also, management forecasts may be motivated to preempt litigation risk (Skinner 1994; Kasznik 
and Lev 1995) or to lower analyst expectations (Matsumoto 2002), whereas reporting non-GAAP earnings 
at the earnings announcement is unlikely to lead to these alternative objectives. 
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financial statements” (page 5).  Watts (2003) adopts this definition of conservatism but 
also emphasizes that “conservatism refers to the cumulative financial effects represented 
in the balance sheet and to income or earnings cumulated since the firm began operation” 
(page 208). Beaver and Ryan (2005) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) characterize the 
asymmetric timeliness of loss versus gain recognition examined in Basu’s seminal paper 
as “conditional conservatism” to better reflect the news dependent nature of such 
conservatism. In contrast, “unconditional conservatism” refers to the type of asset 
understatements that do not depend on the outcome of business events.4  
 Accounting conservatism existed long before formal accounting standards were 
established, and its popularity continues to rise in recent years (Basu 1997; Givoly and 
Hayn 2000; Watts 2003; Lobo and Zhou 2006). Watts (2003) offers some explanations 
for accounting conservatism based on economic incentives. Watts argues that 
conservatism results from the demand to improve contracting efficiency between a firm 
and various parties, to mitigate the risk of shareholder litigation, and to reduce tax and 
political costs.5 Ball and Shivakumar (2005) emphasize that only conditional 
conservatism can improve contracting efficiency because unconditional conservatism of 
known magnitude (which understates an asset’s balance in a systematic manner) can be 
inferred and contracted around by parties involved. Consistent with their conjecture, 
Qiang (2007) finds conditional conservatism, but not unconditional conservatism, is 
                                                            
4 Examples of unconditional conservatism are the expensing of R&D expenditures or the use of the LIFO 
inventory assumption in periods of rising prices. Under these methods, the amount or timing of expense 
recognition requires little managerial discretion and is not conditional on certain business outcome, such as 
the success of a new project.  
5 As Watts summarizes in the paper, “conservatism is a means of addressing moral hazards by parties to the 
firm having asymmetric information, asymmetric payoffs, limited horizon, and limited liability” (Watts 
2003, page 209). 
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associated with contracting costs, suggesting that only conditional conservatism 
facilitates contracting efficiency. 
Asymmetric information between managers and shareholders and the limited 
horizon of managers create opportunities for managers to take self-serving actions at the 
expense of shareholders’ wealth. For example, if compensation is tied to earnings, then 
managers may be motivated to inflate current period earnings or invest in negative-NPV 
projects with positive short-term results in order to maximize their compensation. The 
dysfunctional incentives are especially descriptive of companies with low managerial 
ownership. Consistent with the contention of Watts (2003), LaFond and Roychowdhury 
(2008) document that companies with lower managerial ownership are more 
conservative. Specifically, conservatism can potentially constrain managerial 
opportunism in two ways in the view of the two researchers. First, by requiring lower 
verifiability for losses, the downward bias induced by conservatism partly offsets the 
upward bias arising from earnings management motivated by managers’ desire to attain 
higher compensation.6 Second, a reporting policy that requires accelerating loss 
recognition discourages managers from investing in negative NPV projects that have 
short-term positive outcomes or solely cater to managers’ self interest (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005).  
 Conditional conservatism may also arise from lenders’ asymmetric exposure to 
bad versus good news. By imposing stricter verification requirement on gains than on 
losses, conditional conservatism provides greater assurance to creditors on the security of 
their investments by reducing earnings available for distributions to shareholders and by 
                                                            
6 Linking executive compensation to conservative earnings can also reduce the costly ex-post settling up 
problem (Leone et al. 2006). 
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preventing managers from taking on excessively risky projects (Ahmed et al. 2002; Ball 
and Shivakumar 2005).  Timely recognition of losses but not gains also makes covenant 
violations more likely (Zhang 2008). Consistent with these propositions, several 
empirical papers report a negative relation between different measures for cost of debt 
and conservatism (Ahmed et al. 2002; Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; Zhang 2008), 
consistent with conservatism reducing debt contracting costs. Ball, Robin, and Sadka 
(2008) show that differential timeliness of earnings increases in the size of debt markets 
at the country level. Although Guay and Verrecchia (2008) question how conservatism 
improves debt contracting efficiency when lenders can write firm and transaction specific 
contracts, Beatty, Weber, and Yu (2008) report a positive association between debt 
contract modifications (specifically, adjustments contained in net worth covenants to 
exclude a part of positive income in the calculations) and financial reporting 
conservatism that is not explained by other demands, suggesting that the ability to 
customize debt contracts does not preclude creditors’ demand for conservative financial 
reporting. 
 
2.3 Conservatism and Equity Valuation 
 The role of accounting conservatism in equity valuation is unclear. FASB regards 
biases, regardless of directions, as undesirable for financial reporting (Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, paragraphs 92 and 94). On the other hand, Watts 
(2003) argues that FASB fails to recognize the beneficial effects of conservatism in 
contracting. By addressing the underlying uncertainty surrounding various contracts, 
conservatism eventually increases the wealth of shareholders (Watts 2003). LaFond and 
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Watts (2008) report evidence consistent with conditional conservatism reducing the 
information asymmetry between inside and outside investors, as proxied by the 
probability of informed trading (PIN). Lower information asymmetry can in turn reduce 
deadweight losses and increase firm value. Guay and Verrecchia (2007) posit that 
conservatism, which they regard as managers’ precommitment to disclose bad news, 
creates part of the conditions that lead to full disclosure and in turn, lower cost of capital. 
Empirical evidence is mixed on the relation between conditional conservatism and the 
cost of equity capital. Francis et al. (2004) examine key earnings attributes and find no 
association between cost of equity and Basu’s differential timeliness measure, but recent 
work by Lara et al. (2010) documents a decreasing cost of capital in conservatism using 
Callen et al.’s conservatism ratio.7 
Information produced by timely recognition of unrealized bad news is highly 
relevant for assessing future cash flows, but timely loss recognition produces transitory 
negative amounts in reported earnings. Investors will probably want to separate recurring 
and non-recurring portions of earnings, which means a conservative reporting choice 
requires them to exert more effort to analyze earnings. In particular, investors with 
limited attention may fail to process information that is not salient because processing 
non-salient information incurs additional cognitive costs (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). To 
the extent that the effects of conservatism on earnings are separately identified and 
labeled as special items, investors may be more likely to make correct assessments. 
                                                            
7 Another line of literature focuses on the effect of unconditional conservatism on equity valuation. For 
example, Ahmed, Morton, and Schaeffer (2000) and Mason (2004) confirm the prediction of the Feltham 
and Ohlson (1995) model that investors assign greater multiples to operating assets of more conservative 
companies. Other studies argue that the “balance sheet” type of conservatism can at times hinder investors’ 
assessment of equity value (Penman and Zhang 2002; Lev et al. 2005; Rajan et al. 2007). 
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Research shows that special items are also commonly excluded by analysts (Bradshaw 
and Sloan 2002; Gu and Chen 2004). However, analysts do not exclude all special items, 
and the evidence of differential timeliness of earnings is pervasive in different line items 
from the income statement (Basu 1997). If investors are unable to accurately identify the 
transitory components of earnings that are products of timely loss recognition, they will 
not successfully assign appropriate multiples that reflect the transitory nature of these 
items. In other words, conditional conservatism may impose greater information 
processing costs on equity investors, despite the fact that conservatism is implemented to 
reduce contracting costs and consequently maximize firm value.  
 
2.4 The Joint Effect of Conservatism and Equity Focus on Voluntary Disclosure 
If companies face conditions that demand highly efficient contracts, they may 
respond to the situation by reporting conservatively to reduce contracting costs. If the 
same companies also wish to ensure that investors recognize transitory items arising from 
this timely loss recognition, managers can balance the two conflicting incentives in two 
ways. First, managers may adjust the level of conservatism by choosing not to follow the 
conservative policy in periods when they foresee an increased demand for proper 
valuation of the company’s stock. However, accounting conservatism is likely a “sticky” 
policy. If managers are allowed discretion to deviate from the conservative reporting 
policy in selected periods, such a reporting policy is unlikely to effectively address 
underlying issues (e.g. information asymmetry) that create a demand for conditional 
conservatism. For example, if managers are allowed to delay loss recognition and thus 
extend the life of an unprofitable investment project, such flexibility would not 
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effectively prevent managers from taking risky, negative NPV projects ex ante (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005). Also, basing executive compensation or debt covenants on earnings 
that do not consistently incorporate timely loss recognition will not mitigate ex-post 
settling up or trigger covenants more easily.  
A second way for managers to balance contracting efficiency and valuation 
considerations is through increased disclosure. As discussed earlier, conditional 
conservatism produces transitory losses. In other words, conservatism can create one of 
the conditions that reduce the informativeness of GAAP earnings, and highly price-
conscious managers may respond to the issue by informing the markets about the 
differential persistence of earnings via the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. This leads 
to my second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Conditional conservatism enhances the increasing effect of valuation focus on the 
propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings. 
 
 My first hypothesis builds upon the notion that, to the extent that earnings contain 
transitory components, managers with a strong valuation focus may issue non-GAAP 
earnings to highlight such items. H2 describes a factor, conditional conservatism, that can 
intensify the effect predicted in H1. Stated differently, H1 predicts a main effect of equity 
valuation focus on the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings, while H2 concerns the 
modifying effect of conditional conservatism on the relation between valuation focus and 
disclosure. The question remains as to whether conditional conservatism alone plays any 
role in the decision to report non-GAAP earnings. In other words, for companies with 
16 
 
only a moderate concern about equity valuation, would conservative reporting somehow 
increase or decrease their tendency to disclose non-GAAP earnings? Both Li (2008) and 
Hui et al. (2009) use management forecasts to investigate the relation between 
conservatism and voluntary disclosure. Li (2008) argues that conservatism increases the 
need to forewarn analysts of lower earnings, while Hui et al. (2009) posit that timely loss 
recognition lowers the demand for preempting bad news.8 Because actual non-GAAP 
results are not released until the earnings announcement, reporting non-GAAP earnings 
cannot be motivated by the desire to preempt bad news.  
Conditional conservatism may directly motivate the use of pro forma earnings for 
firms with only a modest concern about valuation if non-shareholder contracting parties 
who demand conservatism also frequently refer to these non-GAAP metrics.  However, 
little is known about whether non-GAAP performance measures are useful for other 
stakeholders. In addition, the sample in my study consists of only public companies 
which are unlikely to have zero demand for conservatism or zero concern about 
valuation, and therefore empirically observing a main effect of conservatism is possible 
for this reason. In the absence of a comprehensive understanding of how conservatism 
alone may affect the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings, I leave the effect of conservatism 
on the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings as a research question to be investigated. 
 
RQ1: Does conditional conservatism affect the propensity to disclose non-GAAP 
earnings? 
 
                                                            
8 Neither of the two studies draws a significant distinction between conditional and unconditional 
conservatism.  
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 Prior literature suggests that conditional conservatism is induced by contracting 
costs, which are functions of factors such as information asymmetry. If conditional 
conservatism is found to directly or indirectly affect the disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings, then the observed relation could be driven by the underlying factors that create 
the demand for conservatism rather than by conservatism per se. To understand how 
conservatism affects the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings, I include a second research 
question: 
 
RQ2:  Do contracting costs increase the propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings? And 
if so, is the increase due to links from contracting costs to conservatism to non-GAAP 
earnings disclosure? 
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Chapter 3 Research Design 
3. 1 Model and Main Variables 
 All of the above hypotheses and research questions can be examined in a single 
model. Below I describe in detail how each construct is measured in the study. 
 
3.1.1 Equity Valuation Focus 
 H1 predicts that the existence of a strong focus on equity valuation will increase 
the use of non-GAAP earnings. Prior studies in the voluntary disclosure literature have 
already examined capital market transactions as a possible motive for voluntary 
disclosure, although pro forma earnings is rarely the chosen measure of voluntary 
disclosure in these studies. Several papers report an increase in certain types of voluntary 
disclosure for companies that access capital markets more frequently (Lang and 
Lundholm 1993; Frankel et al. 1995; Lang and Lundholm 2000).9 Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) find that analysts’ ratings of disclosure tend to be higher prior to equity or debt 
financing events. Frankel et al. (1995) show that companies that access capital markets 
more frequently issue more management forecasts in the long run. In a later study, Lang 
and Lundholm (2000) study the content of news released by companies before equity 
offerings and find evidence of some firms hyping their stock by releasing more optimistic 
news shortly before financing activities. However, Lang and Lundholm (2000) also find 
evidence that companies that consistently disclose more information experience much 
less price decline at the time of equity offering announcements, suggesting that disclosure 
indeed reduces information asymmetry.   
                                                            
9 One exception is Botosan and Harris (2000), who report no evidence that companies with greater 
propensity to access capital markets are more likely to initiate quarterly segment disclosure. 
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 Following these studies, I use a company’s propensity to access capital markets as 
the proxy for the strength of management’s concern about equity valuation. Prior studies 
generally measure the existence of external debt or equity financing events around or 
subsequent to the window in which the change in disclosure activities is measured 
(Frankel et al. 1995; Botosan and Harris 2000; Richardson et al. 2004; Verrecchia and 
Weber 2006; Francis et al. 2008). Lang and Lundholm (2000) show that compared to 
non-offering firms, offering companies release more favorable news during the six 
months prior to the announcement of the offering, but the increased disclosure is even 
more pronounced during the eighteen months subsequent to the announcement. Frankel et 
al. (1995) show that companies with a higher propensity to access capital markets 
consistently issue more management forecasts. Based on these findings, I measure the 
propensity to access capital markets based on the existence of equity financing activities 
prior to and shortly after the disclosure of pro forma earnings. Specifically, valuation 
focus is proxied by an indicator variable, OFFER, coded as one for companies that sell 
equity during an eight-quarter window surrounding the end of the fiscal year for which 
the disclosure of pro forma earnings is measured.10 The eight quarters encompass the 
eighteen months preceding the said fiscal year end as well as the succeeding six months. 
A company is identified as selling equity in a given quarter if the amount of cash from 
sales of common and preferred stock during the quarter equals one percent or more of 
beginning-of-quarter market value of the company’s common equity.11  
                                                            
10 In additional sensitivity tests, I also repeat the main analyses with different windows in which equity 
financing activities are measured. 
11 Following Richardson et al. (2004), I exclude the smallest sales of equity as these issuances are likely 
due to the exercise of employee stock options. 
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Voluntary disclosure can also be motivated by management’s concern about the 
effect of stock price on their job security and personal wealth (Healy and Palepu 2001). 
Nagar et al. (2003) argue that managers would be more willing to release private 
information when their wealth substantially depends on the value of their employers’ 
stock price. The ideal measure of how sensitive one’s personal wealth is to the price of 
his/her employer’s stock would be the ratio of managers’ equity-based compensation to 
personal wealth (Nagar et al. 2003). Since data on personal wealth are not available, I 
consider using three measures to capture the equity valuation demand that is driven by 
personal wealth considerations related to equity compensation: the value of unexercised 
stock options owned by the company’s CEO, the percentage of CEO compensation that is 
stock-based, and the level of CEO equity ownership.12  
 
3.1.2 Accounting Conservatism 
 As discussed earlier, only conditional conservatism, or asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings, is likely to improve contracting efficiency. Thus, the proper measure of 
conservatism for my tests should exclusively reflect the news dependent nature of 
conditional conservatism and measure the cross-sectional variation in asymmetric 
timeliness of losses versus gains. Although I perceive conservatism to be a reporting 
policy that does not drastically vary from one year to another, researchers can only 
                                                            
12 The level of CEO ownership is intended to capture how the value of CEO’s stockholding is affected by 
changes in the price of the company’s stock.  Intuitively, the higher the level of CEO ownership is, the 
larger the effect of changes in stock price would be on the CEO’s personal wealth. So managers would be 
more concerned about equity valuation if their stockholdings are large. However, Nagar et al. (2003) show 
a negative overall effect of insider ownership on the frequency of management forecasts. They further 
demonstrate the existence of non-linearity in the negative relation and the effect is positive and 
insignificant when insider ownership is small. Given their findings, observing a negative relation between 
the level of CEO ownership and the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings in my sample is also possible. 
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observe timely reporting of losses in periods containing substantial bad news. In good 
news periods, one cannot readily distinguish between conditionally conservative and non-
conservative earnings based on reported numbers. For example, the observed level of 
conservatism should be higher for a firm year in which unrealized future losses related to 
an unpromising project are immediately accrued in full. When this occurs, managers are 
more likely to consider issuing additional voluntary disclosure to explain the effect of 
conservatism on reported earnings. In other words, a multi-year policy of conditional 
conservatism does not spur the reporting of non-GAAP earnings in every year; the 
additional disclosure is only needed in periods when transitory losses appear in income. 
Thus, a firm-year level measure of conditional conservatism seems more appropriate than 
a firm-level measure for my study. 
One approach to measuring conservatism at the firm-year level is to estimate the 
Basu model for each sample firm using time-series data with a fixed or rolling window of 
estimation that generates a firm or firm-year level measure of asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings.13 However, this approach has at least two disadvantages. First, the requirement 
of firm-level time-series data of a reasonably long horizon could lead to a small sample 
size and induce a survivor bias in sample formation. Second, the measure cannot be 
reliably estimated if a company does not have overall bad news in any of the years used 
for estimation.  
                                                            
13 Basu uses annual stock returns to distinguish between good and bad news periods. He regresses earnings 
on stock returns, a dummy variable of negative stock returns for bad news, and an interaction term of the 
two. A positive coefficient on the interaction term of bad news dummy variable and stock returns indicates 
that earnings incorporates bad news more timely. Subsequent studies sometimes use the ratio of the 
coefficient on the interaction term to the sum of the coefficient on the interaction term and the coefficient 
on stock returns as the measure of relative timeliness of losses versus gains. 
22 
 
Khan and Watts (2009) extend Basu’s study and propose a firm-year measure of 
conservatism, which they refer to as C_SCORE. This measure is developed based on the 
notion that accounting conservatism varies with firm size, market-to-book ratio, and 
leverage, as these factors have been reported in prior studies to reflect underlying 
conditions that create differential contracting demand for conservatism. The details 
regarding how to estimate the C_SCORE are described in the Appendix 2.  By factoring  
size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage into a cross-sectional Basu regression, the 
resulting C_SCORE closely resembles the Basu coefficient while overcoming the two 
disadvantages of estimating the Basu model using time-series data. Hence, I use the 
C_SCORE as the measure of conditional conservatism.  
A few studies challenge the validity of differential earnings timeliness measures 
derived from Basu’s earnings-return regression (Dietrich et al. 2007; Givoly et al. 2007).  
Dietrich et al. argue that the asymmetric timeliness measure from the earnings-return 
regression is biased because returns are endogenous on earnings and non-earnings news. 
Givoly et al. observe that Basu’s differential timeliness measure can lead to false 
conclusions about the existence of conservatism at times.  
Some of these criticisms have been addressed in depth by Ball et al. (2009) and 
Ryan (2006).  Ball et al. (2009) formally derive the positive coefficient reported in Basu 
(1997) and subsequent studies. Ball et al. also provide explanations for observed 
asymmetry in operating cash flows, refuting the claim by Dietrich et al. that observed 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings is an artifact of asymmetric timeliness of cash flows.  
They also argue that bias suggested by Dietrich et al. would at best be minimal due to the 
limited ability of earnings to explain contemporary stock returns. 
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As posited by Ryan (2006) and Ball et al. (2009), asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings is the most theoretically sound measure of conditional conservatism. Ryan 
points out that other measures of conservatism, such as market-to-book ratio, cumulative 
nonoperating accruals, or skewness of earnings relative to cash flows, are either driven by 
unconditional conservatism or do not adequately capture the “timeliness” of loss 
recognition. Since my study pertains exclusively to conditional conservatism, an 
empirical proxy that reflects the differential timeliness of earnings seems most 
appropriate. 
One of the concerns raised by Givoly et al. is about the stability of the asymmetric 
timeliness measure. They show that, unlike other measures of conservatism such as book-
to-market ratio or negative cumulative nonoperating accruals, the differential timeliness 
measure does not exhibit high correlation over successive subperiods. However, the news 
dependent nature of conditional conservatism means that observed timeliness of earnings 
will vary across successive subperiods unless news realizations and distributions are 
stable across all subperiods examined. On the other hand, other measures such as book-
to-market ratio or negative cumulative accruals reflect not only conditional but also 
unconditional conservatism, which is larger in magnitude (Ryan 2006). Since 
unconditional conservatism pertains to the use income-decreasing accounting consistently 
regardless of news realizations, measures capturing unconditional conservatism are 
expected to be relatively stable over time.  
Nevertheless, drawing inferences based on a single measure of conservatism can 
be dangerous (Ryan 2006; Givoly et al. 2007). To ensure that the conservatism measure 
distinguishes firm years in which earnings incorporate unrealized bad news from those in 
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which timely loss recognition does not occur, I further filter the sample based on 
additional evidence on the existence of conservative reporting. Pae (2007) shows that 
timely loss recognition is implemented via discretionary accruals. Hence, unexpected 
negative accruals in response to recent bad news, absent prior bad news, likely indicate 
the practice of conservatism. Specifically, I first calculate discretionary accruals by 
estimating a modified Jones model at the industry level. An indicator variable, ACCCON, 
is coded as one for those with negative discretionary accruals, negative 12-month market-
adjusted return in the current fiscal year, and non-negative 12-month market-adjusted 
return in the preceding year, and zero otherwise. ACCCON can be used to filter the 
sample for stronger evidence of timely loss recognition, as well as an alternative measure 
of conditional conservatism. 
 
3.1.3 Disclosure of Non-GAAP Earnings  
 Because my study investigates whether the demand for conservative reporting and 
a strong valuation focus — together or alone — increase companies’ propensity to report 
pro forma earnings, the dependent variable indicates the use of non-GAAP earnings. 
Non-GAAP results are mostly disclosed during quarterly earnings announcements. 
Hence, I search actual press releases from the 8-Ks filed by companies for evidence of 
the use of non-GAAP earnings. The main dependent variable, PRF, is coded as one if a 
company reports pro forma earnings in any quarter of a given fiscal year. Additionally, an 
ordinal variable, NPRF, is used to measure the frequency of the use of pro forma earnings 
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in quarterly earnings announcements within a given year.14 Because year-to-date or prior-
year results are often included in the earnings announcement, some companies report 
year-to-date non-GAAP earnings even when no non-GAAP earnings adjustments are 
made for the most recent quarter. In these cases, I do not code the firms as disclosing 
non-GAAP earnings in that quarter.  
 
3.2 Validating the Relation between Conditional Conservatism and the Contracting 
Demand 
 The prediction of H2 builds upon prior literature that suggests conservatism arises 
from the demand for improved contracting efficiency. Conservatism may, in turn, modify 
companies’ voluntary disclosure behavior because of their valuation considerations. 
Furthermore, such a link only exists for conditional conservatism and not unconditional 
conservatism, as the latter is not perceived to facilitate contracting and generally would 
not produce large transitory earnings that may concern valuation-focused managers. 
Qiang (2007) and Lara et al. (2009) explicitly test whether contracting costs induce both 
types of conservatism and find no association between unconditional conservatism and 
their contracting cost proxies. Specifically, Qiang regresses measures of conditional and 
unconditional conservatism, respectively, on proxies of debt and equity contracting costs, 
as well as other hypothesized stimulants of conservatism, such as litigation risk, 
regulatory cost, and taxation to test for association. Since I use a different measure of 
                                                            
14 I do not use the amount of items excluded from GAAP earnings. I expect that conservative companies 
will need to explain their GAAP earnings more frequently than aggressive reporters. However, whether the 
magnitude of the amount of timely recognized losses will increase in the degree of conservatism is unclear. 
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conditional conservatism, as a confirmatory test I first validate their findings in my 
sample by estimating following two equations. 15 
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 C_SCORE in equation (1) is Khan and Watts’ measure of conditional 
conservatism, or asymmetric timeliness of earnings. C_INDEX, the measure of 
unconditional conservatism, is the Conservatism Index developed by Penman and Zhang 
(2002).16 C_INDEX measures the balance of unrecorded reserves due to expensing of 
R&D and advertising expenditures, as well as the choice of the earnings-suppressing 
LIFO method. C_INDEX is included in equation (1) because larger amounts of 
unrecorded reserves (high C_INDEX) reduce the need for asset write-downs related to 
conditional conservatism (low C_SCORE) (Beaver and Ryan 2005). As for the 
independent variables in the regressions, Qiang (2007) and Lara et al. (2009) use 
measures of corporate governance to proxy for equity contracting cost and leverage-
based measures for debt contracting cost.  Following Qiang (2007), the equity contracting 
                                                            
15 Variables in the models are measured on an annual basis. For brevity the firm and year subscripts are 
omitted in subsequent discussions. 
16 Qiang (2007) uses a measure derived from Beaver and Ryan (2005) that captures the persistent 
understatement of earnings as her proxy for unconditional conservatism. This measure cannot be used in 
my study because it is time-invariant. 
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cost variable, Contract_Eq, is defined as the percentage of independent directors.17  
Proxies for debt contracting cost (Contract_Dbt), firm litigation risk (LIT), regulatory 
cost (REG), and taxation (TAX) are constructed using Compustat data following 
definitions in Qiang (2007).18 Positive λ1 and λ2 in equation (1) would be consistent with 
findings in prior studies that conditional conservatism arises from contracting demand. 
On the other hand, γ1 and γ2 in equation (2) are not expected to be significant because 
unconditional conservatism has not been shown to facilitate contracting.  
 
3.3 Main Model Specification 
 All the hypotheses and research questions can be addressed in a single model. The 
main model is specified as follows in equation (3)19:  
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17 Data on the percentage of independent directors are obtained from the RiskMetrics database and 
supplemented by hand collected data for those not covered by RiskMetrics. Qiang (2007) measures equity 
contracting cost using the percentage of outsiders on the board; she obtained such data from the Compact D 
database. Qiang argues that the percentage of outside directors, a proxy for governance by stockholders, 
reflects the expected equity contracting costs. 
18 Qiang measures debt contracting cost as the ratio of private to total long-term debt. Similar to the equity 
contracting cost variable, the debt contracting cost variable measures the strength of debt governance, 
which reflects the expected debt contracting cost. The firm litigation risk variable is the factor score of five 
market variables: equity beta, share turnover, market value, return skewness, and annual returns. 
Regulatory cost is captured by a binary variable that indicates whether the amount of a company’s sales, 
deflated by average sales in the industry, is in the top quartile of the sample. Finally, tax cost is the 
association between book and tax income, estimated from time-series regressions of income taxes on tax 
expense. All aforementioned variables are constructed using Compustat or CRSP data. 
19 Variables in the models are measured on an annual basis based on annual and quarterly data. For brevity 
the firm and year subscripts are omitted in subsequent discussions. 
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DV, the dependent variable in equation (3), will be either the existence of a non-
GAAP earnings disclosure during the year (PRF) or the frequency of the disclosure 
within the year (NPRF). OFFER and COMP are proxies for the strength of equity 
valuation focus. OFFER is an indicator variable coded as one when the company issues 
stock in the ten quarters around disclosure of pro forma earnings. COMP is one of the 
three variables that measure each of the following: the percentage of equity-based 
compensation (COMP_STKBASE), the value of unexercised stock options owned by the 
CEO deflated by the amount of total compensation (COMP_UNEXOPT), and CEO stock 
ownership (COMP_OWN). C_SCORE is the value of the firm-year measure of 
differential timeliness of earnings developed by Khan and Watts (2009). 
LOGTA, the natural logarithm of total assets, is included as a control variable 
because large companies tend to disclose more. Both Bhattacharya et al. (2004) and 
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) report greater use of pro forma earnings in high tech and 
service sectors, so I add an industry indicator variable, IND, to equation (3) to control for 
the effect of peer pressure on the disclosure decision.20 Botosan and Harris (2000) argue 
that voluntary disclosure is affected by the pressure to conform to industry practice. This 
implies that the propensity to use pro forma earnings is likely higher among high tech and 
service companies due to the greater pressure to conform to the disclosure practice of 
competitors in these sectors.  
 H1 predicts that companies are more likely to report pro forma earnings in the 
presence of a strong focus on equity valuation. Hence, β1 and β2 are expected to be 
                                                            
20 Based on findings in Bhattacharya et al. (2004), IND is coded as one for observations in high tech and  
service industries. I use the definition of Francis and Schipper (1999) for  high tech companies. Service 
companies pertain to those with SIC code of 7000-8999.   
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positive.  H2 suggests that conditional conservatism will further enhance the need to 
communicate with investors regarding the effect of transitory earnings components. This 
results in significantly positive coefficients on the interaction terms, β4 and β5.  The 
estimate for β3 can answer RQ1 concerning whether conservatism alone influences the 
decision to disclose non-GAAP earnings. In particular, a positive value of β3 suggests the 
use of non-GAAP earnings by stakeholders other than current or prospective 
shareholders. If the results show a significant main effect of conservatism on the 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings, RQ2 can be addressed by performing a path analysis 
to identify potential effects of contracting costs on the disclosure of pro forma earnings.  
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Chapter 4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Because my research questions explore the differential propensity to disclose, 
ideally I would like to use a sample of all companies to conduct the test. Unfortunately, 
due to the lack of machine-readable non-GAAP earnings data, the hurdle of manual data 
collection results in a relatively small sample. The small sample size poses a challenge 
for detecting the hypothesized effects. As increasing the sample size is not feasible, I 
want to examine the hypothesized effects in periods in which detecting such effects is 
most likely. The final sample consists only of firm years of US public companies in the 
post-Regulation G period. Section 401(b) of SOX and the subsequent Regulation G are 
intended to deter companies from using non-GAAP financial information to mislead 
investors (Entwistle et al. 2006). Examining the post-SOX period has the benefit of 
reducing noise and therefore, increasing the power of my test. In the pre-SOX period 
when the consequences and penalties of misleading pro forma disclosure were less salient 
to managers, a larger proportion of pro forma earnings may have been disclosed solely to 
mislead investors. In fact, Entwistle et al. examine press releases issued by S&P 500 
companies between 2001 and 2003 and find that the level of reported pro forma earnings 
has gone down from 2001 to 2003 and that presentations of pro forma earnings also 
become less misleading over time. Given the potentially greater variations of motives for 
disclosing pro forma numbers in the pre-SOX period, a larger sample would be necessary 
to detect the hypothesized effects.  Because Regulation G became effective on March 28, 
2003, my sample period consists only of fiscal years 2004 – 2008 of Compustat 
companies to ensure that all fiscal years under study commence after the effective date of 
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Regulation G.  In addition, a few prior studies on pro forma disclosure choose to collect 
all pro forma disclosures over a period of time and match these observations with other 
companies from the same industry of comparable size. I do not choose matching because 
successful matching will likely require comprehensive knowledge of the underlying 
determinants of the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings, but to date researchers have 
limited understanding of such determinants. 
To construct the sample, I first calculate the conservatism measure, C_SCORE, 
and the OFFER variable for each firm year of US companies covered in the Compustat 
database during fiscal 2004-2008. There are 14,477 firm-year observations with non-
missing values of C_SCORE and OFFER. Availability of data required to calculate 
additional test variables further reduces the number of firm years to 5,641. Finally, these 
5,641 observations are sorted into deciles based on C_SCORE, and I retain only 
1,111firms from the top and bottom deciles as the sample. To determine if a company 
discloses non-GAAP earnings, I search filings of 8-Ks for announcements of quarterly 
results using the SEC EDGAR database and, when 8-Ks are not filed, press release 
archives in the Lexis-Nexis database or on the company’s website. The final sample 
consists of 1,014 firm years (from 610 firms) of fiscal 2004 – 2007 with press release 
data that can be retrieved.21 
             Panel A of Table 1 shows the distribution of sample firms by industry.22 No 
single industry accounts for more than ten percent of the sample. The sample seems to be 
                                                            
21 Measuring the OFFER variable for fiscal year 2008 requires data from the first two quarters of fiscal year 
2009, which is only available for a small number of companies. As a result, fiscal year 2008 is excluded 
from the final sample.  
22 Industry classification is based on the 49 industry definitions from the website of Kenneth R. French. 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_49_ind_port.html. 
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a fair representation of the Compustat universe in terms of industry membership, but has 
a notably smaller percentage of trading companies relative to the Compustat universe. 
Retail, wholesale, and electronic equipment are the three largest sectors in the sample; 
together they account for 22% of the sample. The propensity of sample companies to 
disclose non-GAAP earnings is reported in the last two columns. In 45.6% of the sample 
firm years, non-GAAP earnings are included in press releases of actual results in at least 
one quarter of the fiscal year. The percentage decreases to 33.5% when the definition of 
non-GAAP earnings excludes EBIT and EBITDA.23 The evolution of the use of non-
GAAP earnings over recent years is described in Panel B of Table 1. The percentage of 
companies that do not report non-GAAP earnings at all declines slightly from 2004 to 
2007, regardless of whether EBIT and EBITDA are defined as non-GAAP earnings or 
not. Over the entire sample period, 15.2% of firm years have non-GAAP earnings that are 
not EBIT or EBITDA in all four quarters of a given year. In other words, almost half 
(15.2% /33.5% = 45%) of the companies that report non-GAAP earnings do so 
consistently. 
 Recall that the dependent variable in equation (3) is either an indicator variable, 
PRF, coded as one if non-GAAP earnings are disclosed in any quarter of a year, or an 
ordinal variable, NPRF, that records the number of quarters in which non-GAAP earnings 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
23 Prior studies (such as Bhattacharya et al. (2003)) do not consider the use of EBITDA as disclosure of 
non-GAAP earnings because of the long history of EBITDA reporting. However, Reg G requires 
reconciliation for the use of EBIT and EBITDA due to the concern that EBIT and EBITDA are measured in 
a variety of ways across companies. This seems to be a valid concern, as many companies report “adjusted 
EBITDA” which exclude one or more items beyond interest, tax, and depreciation and amortization (for 
example, gain from the sale of assets). 
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are disclosed.24 If non-GAAP earnings are used to inform investors of transitory items 
due to timely loss recognition, disclosed non-GAAP earnings should exceed reported 
GAAP earnings. Some companies report non-GAAP earnings that are less than GAAP 
earnings, which cannot be attributed to conservative financial reporting. Therefore, to 
further reduce measurement error, I also measure the dependent variables differently by 
considering only the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings that exceed reported GAAP 
results. Two additional dependent variables are thus created, UPPRF (dichotomous) and 
NUPPRF (ordinal), to indicate the existence and frequency of disclosure of upward non-
GAAP earnings adjustments.  Panel B of Table 1 also describes the frequency of 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings over time when only upward non-GAAP earnings 
adjustments are considered. As reported in the table, 29.1% (1-70.9%) of the sample 
report upward non-GAAP earnings adjustments in at least one quarter, and 8.1% of 
company years in the sample consistently report upward non-GAAP earnings adjustments 
in all four quarters. 
 Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the main variables 
used for hypothesis testing. The mean and median of C_SCORE are .13 and .12, both of 
which are slightly higher than .105 and .097 reported by Khan and Watts (2009). This is 
not surprising since the sample in this study is comprised of more recent years and prior 
studies report increasing conservatism over time (Givoly and Hayn 2000; Lobo and Zhou 
2006).25 In the sample, 29% of company years have engaged in equity financing activities 
recently (mean of OFFER=.29). On average, 29% of CEO compensation is in the form of 
                                                            
24 In subsequent regression analyses, I follow prior studies and only report results based on the dependent 
variables that disregard the disclosure of EBIT or EBITDA as non-GAAP earnings. 
25 The mean and median reported in Khan and Watts (2009) are based on year 1963 – 2005.  
34 
 
restricted stock or proceeds from exercises of stock options (mean COMP_STKBASE = 
.29). The intrinsic value of CEO’s unexercised options is 3.2 times as large as his/her 
annual total compensation, and on average CEOs in the sample own 8% of their 
employers’ outstanding shares. 
The mean of the dichotomous dependent variable, PRF, is .34. The average 
number of quarters of a year in which non-GAAP earnings are disclosed is .93 (mean of 
NPRF).  Two alternative measures for each of the dependent variables, PRF_EB and 
NPRF_EB, are reported by extending the definition of non-GAAP earnings to include 
disclosures labeled as EBIT or EBITDA as disclosures of non-GAAP earnings.  Thus, 
PRF_EB and NPRF_EB have higher mean values (.46 and 1.45 respectively) compared 
to PRF and NPRF. UPPRF and NUPPRF, the dependent variables that record only 
upward non-GAAP earnings adjustments, have a mean of .29 and .70. For both UPPRF 
and NUPRF, I also report slight variations, UPPRF_EB and NUPPRF_EB, which include 
the disclosed EBIT/EBITDA as non-GAAP earnings.  
 Correlation coefficients among main variables are reported in Panel B of Table 2. 
Note that the strength of a manager’s focus on equity valuation is proxied by the 
existence of equity financing events, OFFER, and three compensation variables: 
COMP_STKBASE, COMP_UNEXOPT, and COMP_OWN.  Table 2 indicates that 
OFFER is not significantly correlated with any measure of the disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings. On the other hand, COMP_STKBASE and COMP_UNEXOPT are positively 
correlated with all disclosure measures, whereas COMP_OWN demonstrates a negative 
association with each of the disclosure measures. C_SCORE, the conservatism measure, 
by construction is strongly negatively associated with LOGTA (Spearman correlation 
35 
 
coefficient = -.506; p-value < .0001), and is also negatively correlated with all disclosure 
measures. Since larger companies generally disclose more, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether the negative correlation between C_SCORE and disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings is driven by the effect of firm size based on simple correlations. Finally, 
ACCCON, the dichotomous variable used to filter C_SCORE for further evidence of 
timely loss recognition, does not show significant correlation with any disclosure 
variable. 
 
4.2 Results of Testing for the Relation between Conditional Conservatism and the 
Contracting Demand 
 Panel A of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of variables used in validating the 
relation between conditional conservatism and the contracting demand. Compared to the 
sample used by Qiang (2007), companies in my sample rely more on private debt (mean 
Contract_Dbt = .94 vs. .76 reported by Qiang), and have lower regulatory costs due to 
smaller market share (Mean REG = .4 vs. .62 reported by Qiang). In addition, sample 
firms exhibit a greater variation in terms of litigation risk and taxation, compared to what 
is reported by Qiang. 
  C_SCORE (the measure of conditional conservatism) and C_INDEX (the measure 
of unconditional conservatism) are then regressed on the proxies for factors affecting the 
demand for conservatism. Results are reported in Panel B of Table 3. As expected, 
C_INDEX is not significantly associated with the two contracting cost variables, 
Contract_Eq and Contract_Dbt. However, contrary to the findings of Qiang, C_SCORE 
is also not significantly related to either of the contracting cost proxies. In addition, the 
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coefficient on LIT is significantly negative, opposite to what is reported by Qiang. These 
differences can occur for several reasons. First, the measures of conditional and 
unconditional conservatism adopted by Qiang are firm-level measures obtained from a 
different model. Second, the sample examined by Qiang consists of different companies 
from a different period, making it possible that the predicted relation does not hold in the 
sample used in my study. Third, C_SCORE may not be a valid proxy for conditional 
conservatism. The third possibility is especially problematic because it casts doubt on the 
validity of using C_SCORE as the main measure of conditional conservatism in my 
study. 
 To further understand the cause of the lack of support for the expected 
association, I first construct Qiang’s conservatism measures, using companies that appear 
in my sample with required data from the prior six years.26 Results (untabulated) based 
on 494 firms show a significantly positive relation between conditional conservatism and 
the proxy for equity contracting cost, but the positive association between conditional 
conservatism and the debt contracting cost variable is statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, the coefficients on REG and TAX are both significantly positive, as opposed 
                                                            
26 Qiang constructs her measures of conditional and unconditional conservatism using regressions of the 
book-to-market ratio on current and six lagged annual stock returns using a sample of 633 firms over 1988-
1999.  She allows for differential timeliness of good and bad news by incorporating indicator variables for 
negative returns in the regressions. In her estimation, the differential timeliness also varies with six proxies 
for factors that induce conservatism via the addition of 3-way interaction terms among the return, the 
indicator variable for negative return, and each of the six proxies for current as well as lagged returns.  The 
six proxies reflect equity contracting cost, debt contracting cost, firm and auditor litigation risks, regulatory 
cost, and cost of taxation.  The unconditional conservatism is measured as one minus the predicted value of 
the firm intercept in the model, as the firm intercept captures the persistent understatement of book value. 
The measure of conditional conservatism is calculated as the sum of predicted value of the 14 two- and 
three-way interaction terms, averaged across sample years for each firm and then multiplied by minus one.  
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to the negative signs reported in her study. These inconsistent results, based on the same 
conditional conservatism measure used by Qiang, suggests that the difference in sample 
period and composition may at least partially contribute to the lack of significance of the 
coefficients on contracting cost variables in results of equation (1). 
 To see whether C_SCORE performs differently in a larger sample, I re-estimate 
equations (1) and (2) using a sample consisting of companies in the original sample, plus 
all other Compustat companies with sufficient machine readable data to construct the 
variables used in equations (1) and (2) in the sample period (a total of 2,676 observations 
from 1,214 companies). Results of this analysis are reported in Panel C of Table 3. The 
coefficients on Contract_Dbt, TAX, and REG are all in the directions reported by Qiang 
and significant at the 5% level or lower. These results based on this larger sample are 
consistent with C_SCORE being the valid proxy for conditional conservatism. However, 
the signs of coefficients on Contract_Eq and LIT remain opposite to what is reported in 
prior studies (Qiang 2007; Ahmed and Duellman 2007), suggesting some fundamental 
differences between C_SCORE and the measure used in Qiang’s study.27 To avoid the 
danger of drawing inferences based on an inappropriate measure, I also employ an 
additional accrual-based measure (ACCCON) to further filter the sample for evidence of 
                                                            
27 I measure Contract_Eq slightly differently from prior studies.  Prior studies test the relation between 
conservatism and the percentage of outsiders on the board, whereas Contract_Eq is defined as the 
percentage of independent directors.  Qiang obtains data on the percentage of outside directors based on the 
availability of officer remuneration information, as non-employee directors would not have remuneration 
information available. RiskMetrics, the major source of director data for my study, determines that a 
director is independent if he/she has “no material connection to the company other than a board seat 
(http://www.riskmetrics.com). The connection can be “financial, personal, or otherwise”. Hence, a non-
employee, outside director may be non-independent if he/she has a material relation to the company, such 
as being a family member of an executive or having a transaction with the company for an amount above 
the materiality threshold.   
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conditional conservatism, and use alternative measures of conditional conservatism in 
sensitivity tests. 
 
4.3 Main Analyses 
 Results of tests of H1 and H2 are reported in Table 4. H1 predicts that companies 
with a stronger focus on equity valuation are more likely to report non-GAAP earnings, 
implying a positive coefficient on OFFER and the three compensation variables, 
COMP_STKBASE, COMP_UNEXOPT, and COMP_OWN. Panel A of Table 4 
summarizes the results based on the dichotomous measures of the disclosure of non-
GAAP earnings. The first three columns report the results with PRF as the dependent 
variable, whereas columns four to six pertain to results based on UPPRF, which 
considers only the cases in which disclosed non-GAAP earnings exceed GAAP earnings 
as the event of disclosure. Consistent with the prediction of H1, the coefficient on 
OFFER is significantly positive at 5% level in all six columns. In contrast, the coefficient 
is negative and insignificant for all compensation measures. These results indicate that 
firms with a higher propensity to access equity markets are more likely to report non-
GAAP earnings, as well as upward non-GAAP adjustments, around the time of security 
offerings. In contrast, CEOs’ equity ownership or compensation does not seem to 
motivate the reporting of non-GAAP earnings, as none of the coefficients on the 
compensation variables is significant.  
 Panel B of Table 4 presents the results based on the ordinal dependent variables 
that measure the number of quarters in which a company reports non-EBIT/EBITDA-
based non-GAAP earnings (NPRF) or such non-GAAP earnings that exceed the 
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comparable GAAP measure (NUPPRF). Unlike in the case of dichotomous variables, I 
do not expect that firms with higher concerns about equity valuation would necessarily 
report non-GAAP earnings in more quarters of a year. Two companies that both 
recognize news equally timely may differ in the manner in which news arrives due to the 
nature of their business. Even if both companies always report non-GAAP earnings to 
highlight the items resulting from timely loss recognition during the quarter in which 
such losses are reported, the one for which news arrives more steadily and frequently in 
smaller amounts may need to disclose non-GAAP earnings in more quarters than the 
other. As a result, I do not predict the sign on the proxies for the strength of equity 
valuation focus.  Again, in Panel B none of the coefficients on the compensation 
measures is significant.  The coefficient on OFFER is again significantly positive in all 
models, suggesting greater propensity to report non-GAAP earnings around stock 
offerings.  
 H2 predicts that conservatism further enhances the effect of valuation concerns on 
the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. Positive coefficients on the interaction terms in 
equation (3) between C_SCORE and OFFER, as well as between C_SCORE and each 
compensation variable, are thus expected.  Contrary to the prediction, Panel A of Table 4 
shows a negative coefficient on C_SCORE_OFFER in all six models, and the negative 
coefficient becomes marginally significant when compensation is measured by the value 
of unexercised stock options owned by the CEO (COMP_UNEXOPT). The negative 
coefficients can also be observed in Panel B of Table 4.  On the other hand, the positive 
(negative) coefficients on COMP_STKBASE and COMP_UNEXOPT (COMP_OWN) do 
not seem meaningful due to the lack of significance in either Panel A and B of Table 4. 
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This suggests that, given a high propensity to access the equity market, companies with 
more conservative financial reporting are not more (or possibly even less) likely to report 
non-GAAP earnings, even though their conservative reporting tends to produce transitory 
losses. 
In terms of control variables, consistent with prior studies, the use of non-GAAP 
earnings is more prevalent in high-tech and service industries as indicated by the 
significantly positive coefficient on IND in all models. LOGTA is highly significant in all 
specifications regardless of how compensation or disclosure of non-GAAP earnings is 
measured. In other words, the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings is particularly common 
among large companies. This observation differs from the finding in Lougee and 
Marquardt (2004), who match their sample firms based on size and industry.28  By 
construction, C_SCORE is negatively related to the market value of the firm, which is 
highly correlated with LOGTA. This raises a question whether the inclusion of LOGTA as 
a control variable in the model is redundant. The inclusion of LOGTA in the model can be 
justified for two reasons. First, size is only one of the three factors used to construct 
C_SCORE, and therefore the correlation between firm size and C_SCORE is far from 
perfect. Second, because both LOGTA and C_SCORE are expected to each have an 
increasing effect on disclosure, the negative relation between the two variables would 
have made a positive coefficient on C_SCORE even more pronounced when LOGTA is 
included in the regression. In other words, instead of the inclusion of LOGTA decreasing 
the coefficient on C_SCORE, I expected inclusion to increase the coefficient on 
                                                            
28 For each sample firm quarter for which non-GAAP earnings are disclosed, Lougee and Marquart identify 
a match firm that operates in the same industry based on 4-digit SIC code and has the closest value of total 
assets. 
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C_SCORE by removing a negative omitted correlated variable bias.29 Both reasons favor 
including LOGTA in the regression.  
  Next, I re-estimate the models reported in Panel A and include additional control 
variables, FOLLOW and NEGSURP. Managers may disclose pro forma earnings in 
response to the demand of analysts and institutional investors (Bowen et al. 2005).30  
Thus, I account for the effect of investor sophistication by including a measure of analyst 
following, FOLLOW, in equation (3). FOLLOW is the number of analysts following the 
firm reported in I/B/E/S in the fiscal year examined, and it equals zero for sample firm 
years not covered by the I/B/E/S. Derived from Lougee and Marquardt (2004), 
NEGSURP is an indicator variable that is coded as one if, in any quarter of a year, 
reported GAAP earnings are lower than the results from the same period in the previous 
year. Panel C of Table 4 summarizes the results, which are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Panel A, with the following exceptions: the significance of the positive 
coefficient on OFFER slightly decreases and the negative coefficients on 
C_SCORE_OFFER are no longer significant. Again, the conclusion remains that 
companies are more likely to report non-GAAP earnings around the sale of stock.  
Although the positive coefficient on FOLLOW is consistent with the conjecture that 
managers disclose non-GAAP earnings to cater to the information demand of 
sophisticated investors, the coefficient is insignificant in all models.  On the other hand, 
                                                            
29 When excluding LOGTA from the model, the coefficient on C_SCORE is indeed more negative in most 
cases. In the regressions reported in Panel A of Table 4, the coefficient on C_SCORE becomes more 
negative and highly significant, ranging from -2.51 to -4.13, when LOGTA is omitted from the model.  
30 Bowen et al. (2005) do not find any relation between institutional ownership and the relative emphasis 
placed by managers on pro forma earnings. However, a positive relation is supported when analyst 
following is used as the proxy for investor sophistication.   
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consistent with findings in prior studies, NEGSURP is positive and highly significant, 
indicating a strong tendency of companies to report non-GAAP earnings when GAAP 
results fall short of prior-year earnings. 
The coefficient on C_SCORE addresses the first research question concerning the 
main effect of conservatism on the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. As shown in Panel 
A, B, and C of Table 4, the coefficient on C_SCORE is negative in almost all 
specifications but is never statistically significant. Hence, this finding suggests that 
conservatism does not have any stand-alone effect on the disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings in the absence of an enhanced focus on equity valuation.  
As a robustness check, I further substitute INST, the level of institutional 
ownership, for FOLLOW, and NEGFE, an indicator variable for the cases in which 
reported EPS is lower than analyst forecast consensus, for NEGSURP, respectively. Panel 
D shows that the coefficient on INST is positive and highly significant, indicating that 
companies with higher institutional ownership are more likely to report non-GAAP 
earnings in general. Not surprisingly, NEGFE behaves similarly (results tabulated in 
Panel E) to NEGSURP, as reported in Lougee and Marquardt (2004). However, the 
significance of the positive coefficient on OFFER becomes lower or completely 
subsumed with the use of control variables concerning the information demand of 
sophisticated investors. When using FOLLOW as the proxy for investor sophistication, 
the coefficient on OFFER is significant at 5% in three of the six columns and at 10% in 
the other three. In Panel D where INST is used as the proxy for investor sophistication, 
the positive coefficient is only marginally significant in four of the six regressions.31  
                                                            
31 Data on institutional ownership initially were obtained for only 976 observations of the sample based on 
matching of the 8-digit CUSIP contained in the Compustat database and the S34 master file in the Thomson 
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A comparison of Panel A to Panel C and Panel D reveals a decrease in the 
significance of the positive coefficient on OFFER when controlling for investor 
sophistication. One potential explanation for the diminishing significance is that both 
OFFER and proxies for investor sophistication are capturing the same underlying 
construct. This doesn’t seem likely given the negative correlation between OFFER and 
FOLLOW (Pearson coefficient of correlation = -.17 with p-value less than 1%) as well as 
between OFFER and INST (Pearson coefficient of correlation = -.12 with p-value less 
than 1%). Another possible explanation is that the investor sophistication proxies are 
omitted variables that are correlated with the variable of interest (OFFER). Given the 
positive association between non-GAAP disclosure and each of OFFER, FOLLOW, and 
INST, adding an omitted variable that is negatively correlated with OFFER should have 
made the coefficient on OFFER more positive.  However, the coefficient on OFFER 
becomes less positive once FOLLOW or INST is included in the regression, a result that is 
inconsistent with a simple omitted variable explanation. Overall, the limited evidence 
here does not allow me to draw a definite conclusion on the interplay between investor 
sophistication and the higher propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings around stock 
offerings.  Further research is needed to understand how investor sophistication affects 
the increased disclosure around equity financings. 
 In Panel E, where NEGSURP is replaced by NEGFE, the significance of the 
positive coefficient on OFFER becomes fully subsumed. To better understand the cause 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Reuters database. For the remaining 38 observations, I extract institutional ownership data based on the 
match of 6-digit CUSIP (10 observations), stock ticker (12 observations) and name of the company (16 
observations). In an alternative analysis, I assign the value of zero for INST to all 38 observations. Results 
are similar except the coefficient on OFFER is slightly larger across all six specifications and marginally 
significant in all but one specification.      
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to the loss of significance, I re-estimate the regressions reported in Panel A and Panel C 
using the reduced sample with available data to construct NEGFE. Results show a 
decrease in significance of the coefficient on OFFER compared to those reported in Panel 
A and Panel C based on the full sample, suggesting that the reduction in significance is at 
least partially attributed to the smaller sample size.  Furthermore, although NEGFE 
captures a different aspect of bad news, it may be subject to greater measurement errors 
than NEGSURP. NEGFE is constructed by comparing reported GAAP earnings to 
earnings forecasted by analysts.  Since analysts usually do not forecast GAAP earnings, 
NEGFE likely overstates the extent of bad news in general. Hence, the loss of 
significance of the coefficient on OFFER may also be attributed to the greater 
measurement error of NEGFE. 
Since the findings above provide no evidence for a main effect of conservatism on 
the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings, RQ2 is no longer meaningful. Nevertheless, I 
substitute contracting cost variables for C_SCORE in equation (3) to see if the use of 
non-GAAP earnings is related to expected equity and debt contracting costs. Reported 
results in Table 5 show a positive coefficient on Contract_Eq in columns 1, 4 and 5, 
suggesting that a positive relation between equity contracting cost and the propensity to 
disclose non-GAAP earnings may exist.32 However, the positive relation is sensitive to 
the definitions of CEO compensation.  
                                                            
32 Note that the positive coefficient on OFFER becomes insignificant at conventional levels. Further 
analyses (not reported) indicate that the significance in the models reported in Panels A-C of Table 4 likely 
occurs because C_SCORE and LOGTA combine to effectively control for size and other factors, which 
allows the importance of OFFER to be apparent; Contract_Eq is not effective in controlling for these other 
factors, and thus OFFER is no longer significant. 
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Taken together, the results of the regression analyses lend partial support for an 
increasing effect of valuation concerns related to stock offerings, but do not present 
sufficient evidence for a main or modifying effect of conservatism on the disclosure of 
non-GAAP earnings. If a significant portion of companies report non-GAAP earnings to 
better inform investors of transitory components of earnings, one would expect a greater 
use of non-GAAP earnings among firms that produce more transitory items – that is, 
those reporting conservatively by recognizing losses timely. However, increased use of 
non-GAAP earnings cannot be observed even among companies with conservative 
reporting and with managers who are faced with incentives that particularly enhance their 
concerns about valuation of the company’s stock, casting doubt on the claim that non-
GAAP earnings are used to inform investors of transitory items. 
At the first glance, the lack of support for a higher propensity to use non-GAAP 
earnings among companies that are predisposed to producing transitory losses does not 
seem to reconcile with the findings in prior literature that markets generally find non-
GAAP earnings more useful and that analysts make adjustments to the non-GAAP 
earnings reported by managers. In a research report on the use pro forma earnings, 
analysts at Bear Stearn explain that some items that occur frequently may still be 
excluded from reported results by analysts because these items are not considered 
important for the purpose of equity valuation and as a result, analysts do not try to predict 
these items.33 If managers and analysts share the same view of these items, non-GAAP 
adjustments made by managers can then contain some non-transitory items even if 
managers truthfully report the non-GAAP numbers that they think are most useful for 
                                                            
33 Pro Forma Earnings: A Critical Perspective – An Industry-by-Industry Assessment of Pro Forma 
Earnings Reporting. September 2002. Global Equity Research, Bear, Stearn & Co. Inc. 
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valuation. In fact, the SEC seems to concur that non-GAAP measures excluding recurring 
items can still be useful. In a recent update on the use of non-GAAP measures, the 
Commission essentially permits the exclusion of non-transitory items in calculating non-
GAAP measures, as long as companies do not describe such items as nonrecurring, 
infrequent, or unusual.34 In other words, what the SEC strives to deter is the use of non-
GAAP earnings that masks recurring items as nonrecurring and not the use of non-GAAP 
earnings that exclude recurring items. 
 
4.4 Additional Tests  
4.4.1 Evidence of Timely Loss Recognition 
As discussed in Chapter 3, ACCCON is an additional variable that should identify 
the periods in which timely loss recognition is particularly evident. I first repeat the main 
regression analyses using a sample in which C_SCORE and ACCCON produce consistent 
classification.35 Results based on this reduced sample of 515 firm years are reported in 
Panel A of Table 6 and closely resemble those reported in Panel C of Table 4. Panel B 
summarizes the results using ACCCON as the measure of conservatism instead of 
C_SCORE in the main regressions based on the full sample of 1,014 firm years. Again, 
results show an increased propensity to report non-GAAP earnings around equity 
offerings, and the increased propensity is even more pronounced in the models in which 
only upward non-GAAP earnings adjustments are regarded as the disclosure of non-
                                                            
34 See the answers to Question 102.03 of Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations 
(http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/nongaapinterp.htm). 
35 That is, only firm years in the highest (lowest) decile of C_SCORE with ACCCON=1(0) are retained in 
the reduced sample. 
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GAAP earnings (DV=UPPRF) . I find no evidence of a greater use of non-GAAP 
earnings when financial reporting is conservative. In fact, the marginally significantly 
negative coefficient on ACCCON_OFFER suggests that, conditioned on a high 
propensity to access equity markets, companies with more transitory losses from 
conservative reporting are less likely to report upward non-GAAP earnings adjustments. 
 
4.4.2 Alternative Measure of Conditional Conservatism 
 Two additional firm-year measures of conditional conservatism are used to 
substitute for C_SCORE to see if results are affected. The first measure used is the 
Conservatism Ratio (CR) recently developed by Callen, Hope, and Segal (2010). Callen 
et al. built upon the Vuolteenaho model (2002) to decompose the news in stock returns 
into earnings news and discount rate news. CR, the conservatism ratio, is then calculated 
as the ratio of the unexpected current period earnings news to total earnings news for 
both current and future periods. Given the occurrence of bad (good) news (proxied by 
negative (positive) stock return), a larger (smaller) CR indicates more  conservative 
reporting as bad (good) news is incorporated in earnings more (less) timely. 36 Details 
about the estimation of CR are also included in Appendix 2.  
 The second measure used is the negative cumulative nonoperating accruals 
(NOPACC).37 Based on the notion that the amount of cumulative income before 
                                                            
36 Callen et al. argue that CR is not subject to some of criticisms of the estimation of the Basu model. 
However, interpreting a negative CR can be difficult. As discussed by Callen et al., a negative CR can be 
caused by either overly aggressive or conservative accounting. Consequently, they exclude the negative 
CRs from their analysis. 
37 NOPACC is measured as (-1)*cumulative nonoperating accruals, scaled by beginning total assets. 
Cumulative nonoperating accruals are calculated as: net income + depreciation - cash flows from 
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depreciation and amortization should converge to the amount of cumulative cash flow 
from operations in a steady state, Givoly and Hayn (2000) show that, consistent with 
increased conservatism over time, cumulative nonoperating accruals exhibit a 
progressively downward pattern. They argue that cumulative nonoperating accruals 
consist of items such as changes of estimates, restructuring charges, or asset write-downs. 
Thus, the magnitude of cumulative nonoperating accruals likely reflects the degree of 
timely recognition of losses.  
 Results based on CR and NOPACC are presented in Panel A and B of Table 7, 
respectively. Although neither of the two measures is highly correlated with the 
C_SCORE, inferences for main variables based on the two measures are not substantially 
different from those based on the C_SCORE. 38 The coefficient on OFFER is 
significantly positive in both Panel A and B when considering only disclosures of non-
GAAP earnings that exceeds GAAP results, indicating that upward non-GAAP 
adjustments are more likely to be made by offering firms. On the other hand, the 
significance of the positive coefficient either substantially decreases or completely 
disappears in the models with PRF as the dependent variable. This contrast suggests the 
existence of an “asymmetry” in the use of non-GAAP earnings, as the increased 
propensity to report non-GAAP earnings around stock offerings can only be observed for 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
operations - (∆Accounts Receivable + ∆Inventories +∆Prepaid Expenses- ∆Accounts Payable-∆Taxes 
Payable).   
 
38 The Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficient between C_SCORE and CR in the reduced sample of 601 
observations is -.113 (.074) with a p-value of .005 (.071). The Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficient 
between C_SCORE and NOPACC in the reduced sample of 506 observations is -.081 (-.023) with a p-value 
of .068 (.601).  
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upward non-GAAP earnings adjustments. In addition, in Panel B of Table 7, the 
coefficient on COMP_OWN is significantly negative regardless of how disclosure is 
measured, implying that managers may become more reluctant to report non-GAAP 
earnings as their ownership increases.39 This is also observed, albeit of a lower 
significance, when conservatism is proxied by ACCCON.  
 
4.4.3 Alternative Definition of Non-GAAP Earnings 
 I repeat all the regression analyses reported in Table 4 – 7 by replacing the 
dependent variables with those that include the disclosure of EBIT/EBITDA as non-
GAAP earnings. In theory, items excluded from net income to calculate EBIT/EBITDA 
are likely recurring, and therefore results based on the alternative dependent variables 
should be similar or weaker.40 On the other hand, some companies exclude items other 
than interest, taxes, and depreciation and amortization costs and report an “adjusted 
EBITDA”.  If those additional exclusions pertain to transitory items resulting from timely 
loss recognition, then using alternative dependent variables may arrive at different 
conclusions about the effect of conservatism and valuation incentives. 
 The main conclusions from these analyses (results not tabulated) concerning the 
predictions of H1 and H2 are unaffected by the use of the alternative dependent variables. 
Specifically, the coefficient on OFFER is significantly positive in almost all models 
                                                            
39 The significantly negative coefficient is consistent with the finding of Nagar et al. (2003), who document 
a negative effect of insider ownership on the frequency of management forecasts.  
40 For companies that consistently report EBIT/EBITDA in every fiscal quarter, using these alternative 
dependent variables in the models will likely add more noise to the models. 
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based on the full sample.41 In addition, even in the reduced samples where alternative 
control variables INST or NEGFE are used, the significance of the positive coefficient on 
OFFER is not completely subsumed by these proxies for the information demand from 
sophisticated investors. Furthermore, the coefficient on C_SCORE (as well as CR and 
NOPACC) is positive and becomes significant at 10% or lower in some models. Overall, 
results regarding increased propensity to report non-GAAP earnings around equity 
offerings are even stronger when including EBIT/EBITDA as non-GAAP metrics. The 
stronger results, combined with the significantly positive coefficient on C_SCORE, are 
surprising, as researchers do not always view EBIT/EBITDA as pro forma earnings 
(Bhattacharya et al. 2003).   
 
4.4.4 Alternative Measurement Windows of Equity Offerings 
 I also repeat the regression analyses and vary the window in which equity offering 
activities are measured. Specifically, I examine the following windows: the four quarters 
prior to the fiscal year end, the two and four quarters following the fiscal year end, and a 
ten-quarter window consisting of the eight (two) quarters prior to (following) the fiscal 
year end.  The inferences concerning the main variables are similar for three of the four 
alternative windows, although the results (not reported) are generally weaker.42  
  
  
                                                            
41 The only exception occurs when ACCCON is used as the measure of conditional conservatism. 
42 I find no increased propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings around equity offerings when the 
measurement window of offering activity is restricted to the two quarters following the year end. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
 The use of non-GAAP earnings has been controversial. Whether such alternative 
earnings metrics are motivated by managerial opportunism or a genuine desire to enhance 
earnings informativeness remains largely unanswered. Although a number of prior 
studies report evidence consistent with management opportunism, others suggest that 
investors are not misled and that non-GAAP earnings information can be useful. In this 
paper, I approach the question concerning the motive underlying the disclosure of non-
GAAP earnings from yet another angle. Specifically, I first examine whether the use of 
non-GAAP earnings is more prevalent when the costs of investor misinterpretation of 
earnings components are high, such as in the cases of equity offerings or when managers’ 
wealth is more sensitive to changes in stock price. Then I test whether, in the presence of 
strong concerns about equity valuation, the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings is more 
likely to be observed among companies that report conservatively, as timely loss 
recognition results in transitory losses. Finally, I investigate whether conditional 
conservatism alone, in the absence of strong valuation concerns, plays any role in the 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. 
 The main findings of my paper are as follows. First, the disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings is more prevalent around the time of equity offerings, although this finding is 
notably weakened or completely subsumed when controlling for the level of institutional 
ownership and the tendency to meet or beat analyst forecast. On the other hand, results in 
the paper do not provide sufficient support for a significant association between the 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings and proxies for the sensitivity of CEO’s wealth to 
changes in stock price. Finally, conservatism itself has no main effect on the disclosure of 
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non-GAAP earnings. These results are robust to the use of an alternative definition of 
non-GAAP earnings and alternative measures of conditional conservatism developed in 
prior studies, such as C_SCORE (Khan and Watts 2009), Conservatism Ratio (Callen et 
al. 2010), and the amount of negative cumulative nonoperating accruals (Givoly and 
Hayn 2001).  Overall, findings in my paper do not support the conjecture that non-GAAP 
earnings are used to inform investors of transitory earnings components resulting from 
timely loss recognition. 
  The main contribution of this paper is to extend the literature on the disclosure of 
non-GAAP earnings, by providing evidence that casts doubt on the conjecture that non-
GAAP earnings are used to inform investors of transitory items. This paper also adds to 
the growing body of literature on accounting conservatism by exploring the relation 
between conservatism and voluntary disclosure. This paper is subject to a number of 
limitations. For example, because the study samples only the companies that are the most 
and the least conservative companies in the Compustat universe, I am unable to rule out 
the possibility that a main effect of conservatism may be observed in the groups with 
only moderate levels of conservatism (i.e. a non-linear main effect). Also, the 
compensation variables in my study do not include the fair value of outstanding stock 
options and the fair value on the grant date. Future studies can re-examine whether the 
compensation structure is associated with the decision to report non-GAAP earnings. 
Finally, the data used in my study do not allow for additional analyses that focus 
exclusively on the disclosure of EBIT/EBITDA. Whether the EBIT/EBITDA is also used 
in a manner similar to other non-GAAP earnings remains an empirical question for future 
research.  
53 
 
References 
Ahmed, A. S., B. K. Billings, R. M. Morton, M. Harris-Stanford. 2002. The role of 
accounting conservatism in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend 
policy and in reducing debt costs. The Accounting Review 77(4): 867 – 890. 
-----------------, and S. Duellman. 2007. Accounting conservatism and board of director 
characteristics: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting & Economics 43: 411 – 
437. 
-----------------, R. M. Morton, and T. F. Schaefer. 2000. Accounting conservatism and the 
valuation of accounting numbers: Evidence of the Feltham-Ohlson (1996) model. Journal 
of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 15(3): 271 - 292. 
Ball, R., S. P. Kothari, and V. Nikolaev. 2009. Econometrics of the Basu asymmetric 
timeliness coefficient and accounting conservatism. Working Paper. University of 
Chicago and Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
---------, A. Robin, and G. Sadka. 2008. Is financial reporting shaped by equity markets or 
by debt markets? An international study of timeliness and conservatism. Review of 
Accounting Studies 13: 168 – 205. 
---------, and L. Shivakumar. 2005. Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative 
loss      recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting & Economics 39: 83 – 128. 
Basu, S. 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. 
Journal of Accounting & Economics 24: 3 – 37. 
Beatty, A., J. Weber, and J. J. Yu. 2008. Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting & 
Economics 45: 154 – 174. 
Beaver, W. H., and S. G. Ryan. 2005. Conditional and unconditional conservatism: 
Concept and modeling. Review of Accounting Studies 10: 269 – 309. 
Bhattacharya, N., E. L. Black, T. E. Christensen, and C. R. Larson. 2003. Assessing the 
relative informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings and GAAP operating 
earnings. Journal of Accounting & Economics 36: 285 – 319. 
----------------------------------------------------------, and R. D. Mergenthaler. 2004. 
Empirical evidence on recent trends in pro forma reporting. Accounting Horizons 18(1): 
27 – 43. 
Black, D. E., and T. E. Christensen. 2009. US managers’ use of ‘pro forma’ adjustments 
to meet strategic earnings targets. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 36(3) & 
(4): 297 – 326. 
Botosan, C. A. 1997. Disclosure level of the cost of equity capital. The Accounting 
Review 72(3): 323 – 349. 
54 
 
------------------, and M. S. Harris. 2000. Motivations for a change in disclosure frequency 
and its consequences: An examination of voluntary quarterly segment disclosures. 
Journal of Accounting Research 38(2): 329 – 353. 
------------------, and M. A. Plumlee. 2002. A re-examination of disclosure level and the 
expected cost of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research 40(1): 21 – 40. 
Bowen, R. M., A. K. Davis, and D. A. Matsumoto. 2005. Emphasis on pro forma versus 
GAAP earnings in quarterly press releases: Determinants, SEC intervention, and market 
reactions. The Accounting Review 80(4): 1011 – 1038. 
Bradshaw, M. T., and R. G. Sloan. 2002. GAAP versus the Street: An empirical 
assessment of two alternative definitions of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 
40(1): 41 – 66. 
Brown, N. C., T. E. Christensen, W. B. Elliott. 2009. Strategic timing of pro forma 
earnings announcements. Working Paper. University of Southern California, Brigham 
Young University, University of Urbana-Champaign, and University of Iowa. 
Brown, L. D., and K. Sivakumar. 2003. Comparing the value relevance of two operating 
income measures. Review of Accounting Studies 8: 561 – 572. 
Callen, J. L., O. Hope, and D. Segal. 2010. The Pricing of Conservative Accounting and 
the Measurement of Conservatism at the Firm-Year Level. Review of Accounting Studies 
15: 145 - 178. 
Chuk, E., D. Matsumoto, and G. Miller. 2008. Assessing methods of identifying 
management forecasts: CIG vs. Hand-Collection. Working Paper. University of 
Washington. 
Dietrich, J. R., K. A. Muller, and E. J. Riedl. 2007. Asymmetric timeliness test of 
accounting conservatism. Review of Accounting Studies 12: 95 – 124.  
Elliott, W. B. 2006. Are investors influenced by pro forma emphasis and reconciliations 
in earnings announcements? The Accounting Review 81(1): 81 – 133. 
Entwistle, G. M., G. D. Feltham, and C. Mbagwu. 2006. Financial reporting regulation 
and the reporting of pro forma earnings. Accounting Horizons 20(1): 39 – 55. 
Fama, E. F. and K. R. French. 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 43: 153-193. 
Feltham, G. A., and J. A. Ohlson. 1995. Valuation and clean surplus accounting for 
operating and financial activities. Contemporary Accounting Research 11(2): 689 – 731. 
Financial Standards Accounting Board. 1980. Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts No. 2: Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information.  
Francis, J., and K. Schipper. 1999. Have financial statements lost their relevance? Journal 
of Accounting Research 37(2): 319 – 352. 
55 
 
Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. M. Olsson, and K. Schipper. 2004. Cost of equity and earnings 
attributes. The Accounting Review 79(4): 967 – 1010. 
-------------, D. Nanda, and P. Olsson. 2008. Voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and 
cost of capial. Journal of Accounting Research 46(1): 53 – 99. 
Frankel, R., M. McNichols, and G. P. Wilson. 1995. Discretionary disclosure and 
external financing. The Accounting Review 70(1): 135 – 150. 
Frederickson, J. R., and J. Miller. 2004. Disclosures on analysts’ and nonprofessional 
investors’ equity valuation judgments. The Accounting Review 79(3): 667 – 686. 
Givoly, D., and C. Hayn. 2000. The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash 
flows and accruals: Has financial reporting become more conservative? Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 29: 287 – 320. 
-------------------------------, and A. Natarajan. 2007. Measuring accounting conservatism. 
The Accounting Review 82(1): 667 – 686. 
Graham, J. R., C. R. Harvey, and S. Rajgopal. 2005. The economic implications of 
corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting & Economics 40: 3 – 73. 
Gu, Z., and T. Chen. 2004. Analysts’ treatment of nonrecurring items in street earnings. 
Journal of Accounting & Economics 38: 129 – 170. 
Guay, W., and R. Verrecchia. 2007. Conservative disclosure. Working Paper. University 
of Pennsylvania.  
------------------------------------. 2008. Discussion of an economic framework for 
conservative accounting and Bushman and Piotroski (2006). Journal of Accounting & 
Economics 42: 149 – 165. 
Healy, P. M., and K. G. Palepu. 1993. The effect of firms' financial disclosure strategies 
on stock prices. Accounting Horizons 7(1): 1 – 11. 
---------------------------------------. 1995. The challenges of investor communication: The 
case of CUC International, Inc. Journal of Financial Economics 38(2): 111 – 140. 
----------------, Hutton, A. P., and K. G. Palepu. 1999. Stock performance and 
intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 16(3): 485 – 520. 
 ---------------------------------------. 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, 
and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 31: 405 – 440. 
Heflin, F., and C. Hsu. 2008. The impact of the SEC's regulation of non-GAAP 
disclosures. Journal of Accounting & Economics 46: 349 – 365. 
56 
 
Hirshleifer, D., and S. H. Teoh. 2003. Limited attention, information disclosure, and 
financial reporting. Journal of Accounting & Economics 36: 337 – 386. 
Hui, K. W., S. Matsunaga, and D. Morse. 2009. The impact of conservatism on 
management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting & Economics 47: 192 – 207. 
Johnson, W. B., and W. C. Schwartz. 2005. Are investors misled by “pro forma 
earnings”? Contemporary Accounting Research 22(4): 915 – 963. 
Kasznik, R., and B. Lev. 1995. To warn or not to warn: Management disclosures in the 
face of earnings surprise. The Accounting Review 70(1): 113 – 134. 
Khan, M. and R. L. Watts. 2009. Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year 
measure of conservatism. Journal of Accounting & Economics 48: 132 – 150. 
Kolev, K., C. A. Marquardt, and S. E. McVay. 2008. SEC scrutiny and the evolution of 
non-GAAP reporting. The Accounting Review 83(1): 157 – 184. 
Kormendi, R., and R. Lipe. 1987. Earnings innovations, earnings persistence, and stock 
returns. The Journal of Business 60(3): 323 – 345. 
LaFond, R., and S. Roychowdhury. 2008. Managerial ownership and accounting 
conservatism. Journal of Accounting Research 46(1): 101 – 135. 
LaFond, R., and R. L. Watts. 2008. The information role of conservatism. The 
Accounting Review 83(2): 447 – 478. 
Lang, M., and R. Lundholm. 1993. Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of 
corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 31(2): 246 – 271. 
----------------------------------. 2000. Voluntary disclosure and equity offerings: Reducing 
information or hyping the stock? Contemporary Accounting Research 17(4): 623 – 662. 
Lara, J. M. G., B. G. Osma, and F. Penalva. 2009. The economic determinants of 
conditional conservatism. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 36(3) & (4): 336 – 
372. 
----------------------------------------------------. 2010. Conditional conservatism and cost of 
capital. Review of Accounting Studies (forthcoming). 
Leone, A. J., J. S. Wu, and J. L. Zimmerman. 2006. Asymmetric sensitivity of CEO 
compensation to stock returns. Journal of Accounting & Economics 42: 167 – 192. 
Lev, B., S. Sarath, and T. Sougiannis. 2005. R&D reporting biases and their 
consequences.  Contemporary Accounting Research 22(4): 977 – 1026.   
Li, Z. 2008. Accounting conservatism and managers’ forecasting behavior. PhD 
Dissertation. University of Minnesota. 
Lipe, R. C. 1986. The information contained in the components of earnings. Journal of 
Accounting Research 24 (Supplement): 37 - 64. 
57 
 
Lobo, G. J., and J. Zhou. 2006. Did conservatism in financial reporting increase after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial evidence. Accounting Horizons 20(1): 57 – 73. 
Lougee, B. A. and C. A. Marquardt. 2004. Earnings informativeness and strategic 
disclosure: An empirical examination of "pro forma" earnings. The Accounting Review 
79(3): 769 – 795. 
Nagar, V., D. Nanda, and P. Wysocki. 2003. Discretionary disclosure and stock-based 
incentives. Journal of Accounting & Economics 34: 283 – 309. 
Marques, A. 2006. SEC interventions and the frequency and usefulness of non-GAAP 
financial measures. Review of Accounting Studies 11: 549 – 574.  
Mason, L. 2004. The impact of accounting conservatism on the magnitude of the 
differential information content of cash flows and accruals. Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing, and Finance 19(3): 249 - 282. 
Matsumoto, D. A. 2002. Management incentives to avoid earnings surprises. The 
Accounting Review 77(3): 483 – 514. 
Miller, G. S. 2002. Earnings Performance and discretionary disclosure. Journal of 
Accounting Research 40(1): 173 – 204. 
Pae, J. 2007. Unexpected accruals and conditional accounting conservatism. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting 34(5) & (6): 681 -704. 
Penman, S. H., and X. Zhang. 2002. Accounting conservatism, the quality of earnings, 
and stock returns. 2002. The Accounting Review 77(2): 237 – 264. 
Qiang, X. 2007. The effects of contracting, litigation, regulation, and tax costs on 
conditional and unconditional conservatism: Cross-sectional evidence at the firm level. 
The Accounting Review 82(3): 759 – 796. 
Rajan, M. V., S. Reichelstein, and M. T. Soliman. 2007. Conservatism, growth, and 
return on investment. Review of Accounting Studies 12: 325 – 370. 
Richardson, S., S. H. Teoh, and P. D. Wysocki. 2004. The walkdown to beatable analyst 
forecasts: the role of equity issuance and insider trading incentives. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 21(4): 885 – 924. 
Rogers, J. L. 2008. Disclosure quality and management trading incentives. Journal of 
Accounting Research 46(5): 475 – 679. 
Ryan, S. G. 2006. Identifying conditional conservatism. European Accounting Review 
15(4): 511 – 525. 
Skinner, D. J. 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting 
Research 32(1): 38 – 60. 
 
58 
 
Verrecchia, R. E., and J. Weber. 2006. Redacted disclosure. Journal of Accounting 
Research 44(4): 791 – 814. 
Vuolteenaho, T. 2002. What drives firm-level stock returns. Journal of Finance 57: 233 – 
264. 
Watts, R. L. 2003. Conservatism in accounting part I: Explanations and implications. 
Accounting Horizons 17(3): 207 – 221.  
Wittenberg-Moerman, R. 2008. The role of information asymmetry and financial 
reporting quality in debt trading: Evidence from the secondary loan market. Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 46: 240 – 260. 
Yi, H. 2007. Has Regulation G improved the information quality of non-GAAP earnings 
disclosures? Working Paper. University of Oklahoma. 
Zhang, J. 2008. The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and 
borrowers. Journal of Accounting & Economics 45: 27 – 54. 
  
59 
 
Appendix 1: Commonly Used Disclosure Measures 
Below I briefly describe several measures of company-level disclosure that have 
been used in prior literature. 
 Analysts’ ratings of disclosure quality: Following Lang and Lundholm (1993), many 
studies use the disclosure score issued by the former Association of Investment 
Management and Research (AIMR) as a general proxy for the level of disclosure (for 
example, Lang and Lundholm 1996; Sengupta 1998; Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999; 
Botosan and Plumlee 2002).43 The AIMR disclosure scores were produced by financial 
analysts who evaluate the quality of information in mandatory disclosures within 
companies’ annual and quarterly reports, as well as other published communication and 
investors relations (Lang and Lundholm 1993).  The AIMR reports provided not only a 
score for each of the three subcategories of information disclosed by companies but also a 
composite score for the overall quality of disclosure. Such ratings offer a more 
comprehensive measure of disclosure as they are determined by analysts who specialized 
in each particular industry after considering various aspects and venues of disclosure. 
However, these scores were only available for industries and companies covered by 
financial analysts, and AIMR stopped providing such rankings after fiscal year 1996.  
Also, because these scores were based on the judgments of financial analysts, they were 
unavoidably subject to possible known and unknown biases.  
 Management Forecasts: The vast majority of the literature chooses the number of  
                                                            
43 The Association of Investment Management Research is now known as the CFA Institute, preceded by 
the Financial Analyst Federation (FAF). The disclosure scores used in Lang and Lundholm’s study are 
from the Reports of Financial Analyst Federation Corporate Information Committee (FAF Reports).  
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management earnings forecasts as the measure of voluntary disclosure.44 Management 
earnings forecasts contain a rich set of information, as they not only come in different 
forms but also often include detailed explanations for the predicted performance. The 
recent creation of machine readable earnings guidance data further accelerates the 
development of literature on management earnings forecasts by enabling researchers to 
conduct more powerful tests of the effects of changes in regulatory environment on 
voluntary disclosure behavior (Chuk et al. 2008).  
 Self-constructed measures: Some researchers construct their own measures of 
disclosure to overcome the drawbacks of the AIMR scores. For example, Botosan (1997) 
and Francis et al. (2008) construct a disclosure index based on the information provided 
by companies in their annual reports, such as discussions about historical results, key 
financial and non-financial information, and forward-looking information. Although their 
papers examine the content of mandatory reports, their indexes essentially measure the 
level of voluntary disclosure as the decision regarding the quality and quantity of 
information to be included in those sections of annual reports is, to some extent, 
discretionary.  
 Other venues of disclosure: Other researchers investigate voluntary disclosure by  
analyzing firm-initiated communications via various open or closed channels (such as 
conference calls). For example, Lang and Lundholm (2000) and Miller (2002) both 
collect public disclosure data from news retrieval services to study whether their sample 
companies change the level of voluntary disclosure under circumstances of interest.  
                                                            
44 Hirst et al. (2008) provide a most recent review of the management earnings forecast literature.  They 
build their review based on a framework that characterizes research on management earnings forecasts by 
forecast antecedents, characteristics, and consequences. 
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 Market-based measure: Given the assumption of efficient markets, disclosure of  
additional information supposedly reduces the information risk. Therefore, changes in 
market measures such as price or trading volume around the release of disclosures are 
sometimes used as indications for changes in disclosure (for example, Rogers 2008)45. 
  
                                                            
45 Market measures are not appropriate for my study due to the concern that unsophisticated investors may 
not fully understand and adjust their assessments for the effects of conservatism. 
62 
 
Appendix 2: Estimating C_SCORE and CR 
Estimating C_SCORE  
 The C_SCORE measure is devised by Khan and Watts (KW) based on the idea 
that the level of conservatism, as measured by Basu’s asymmetric timeliness of earnings, 
tends to vary with the size, growth opportunities, and leverage of a company. A 
C_SCORE is essentially a linear combination of the value of size, market-to-book ratio, 
and leverage of a company in a certain period.  The following three equations are 
obtained from Khan and Watts (2009) directly. These equations are estimated cross-
sectionally for each year. 
 
Xi,t = β1,t + β2,tDi,t + β3,i,tRi,t + β4,i,tDi,tRi,t + ei,t                                                            KW(1) 
 C_SCORE ≡ β4,i,t = λ1,t + λ2,tSizei,t + λ3,tM/Bi,t + λ4,tLevi,t                                          KW(3) 
 Xi,t = β1 + β2Di,t + Ri,t(μ1 + μ2Sizei,t + μ3M/Bi,t + μ4Levi,t)  
         + Di,tRi,t(λ1 + λ2Sizei,t+ λ3M/Bi,t + λ4Levi,t)                                                         KW(4) 
         + (δ1Sizei + δ2M/Bi + δ3Levi + δ4DiSizei + δ5DiM/Bi + δ6DiLevi) + εi,t                                             
 
 Equation (1) denotes the model specified in the Basu (1997) study. Xi,t is the 
earnings of firm i in year t. Ri,t is the cumulative 12-month return for firm i for year t and 
Di,t, is a bad news proxy that takes on the value of one when the company’s cumulative 
return is negative. In a typical differential timeliness regression, the coefficient on Di,tRi,t  
is regarded as the measure of asymmetric timeliness, or conditional conservatism. 
Because the demand for conservatism has been shown to vary with size, market-to-book 
ratio, and leverage, conceptually the measure of conditional conservatism should vary 
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with these three characteristics. Hence, Khan and Watts express C_SCORE as a linear 
combination of size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage and then substitute this linear 
combination in equation (3) for the coefficient on Di,tRi,t ,. Equation (4) represents the 
fully expanded equation (1) after the substitution. Once the coefficient estimates are 
obtained from equation (4), they will be plugged back into equation (3) to calculate the 
value of C_SCORE for each firm year. 
 
Estimating the Conservatism Ratio (CR) 
  To calculate the CR, Callen, Hope, and Segal (2010, CHS) first estimate the 
following VAR system by industry with three state variables, log stock return (rt), log of 
one plus ROE (roet), and the log book-to-market ratio (bmt)46.  
     rt = α1rt-1 + α2roet-1 + α3bmt-1 + η1t    CHS(6a) 
     roet = β1rt-1 + β2roet-1 + β3bmt-1 + η2t      CHS(6b) 
     bmt = δ1rt-1 + δ2roet-1 + δ3bmt-1 + η4t    CHS(6c) 
 
The earnings news (Net) can then be derived as: 
        CHS(10) 
 
where A represents the VAR coefficient matrix and ρ is a constant discount rate term and  
it is the logarithm of one plus the risk free rate in period t47. The CR is then calculated as: 
                                                            
46 Industry classifications are based on the definitions in Fama-French (1997) 
47 Callen et al. use the annualized three month Treasury bill rate as the risk-free rate in their estimation. 
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              CRt= η2t/Net   
Net represents the total earnings news that will be reflected in earnings of current and 
future periods whereas η2t  is the unexpected earnings news that is reflected in current 
period’s reported earnings. Hence, given the occurrence of bad (good) news, a higher 
(lower) CR indicates greater conservatism. 
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Table 1 Sample Distribution 
Panel A.  Frequency of Disclosure of Non-GAAP Earnings by Industry 
 
Aircraft                   3                0.3                0.4                      -                        -   
Apparel                 23                2.3                0.8                  17.4                  21.7 
Automobiles and Trucks                 13                1.3                1.0                    7.7                  23.1 
Banking                 19                1.9                8.9                  42.1                  47.4 
Beer and Liquor                   6                0.6                0.3                  66.7                  66.7 
Business Services                 55                5.4                3.9                  30.9                  49.1 
Business Supplies                 19                1.9                0.7                  52.6                  79.0 
Candy and Soda                   6                0.6                0.2                  16.7                  50.0 
Chemicals                 34                3.4                1.5                  38.2                  58.8 
Coal                   2                0.2                0.3                      -                  100.0 
Communication                 34                3.4                3.1                  29.4                  76.5 
Computer Hardware                 24                2.4                1.4                  62.5                  62.5 
Computer Software                 34                3.4                6.9                  32.4                  50.0 
Construction                   4                0.4                0.7                  25.0                  25.0 
Construction Materials                 21                2.1                1.2                  42.9                  42.9 
Consumer Goods                 15                1.5                0.9                  26.7                  26.7 
Electrical Equipment                 24                2.4                1.1                  25.0                  25.0 
Electronic Equipment                 70                6.9                4.7                  22.9                  31.4 
Entertainment                 17                1.7                1.2                  47.1                  82.4 
Fabricated Products                   3                0.3                0.2                      -                        -   
Food Products                 25                2.5                1.1                  36.0                  40.0 
Healthcare                 15                1.5                1.1                  33.3                  53.3 
Insurance                 27                2.7                2.4                  33.3                  40.7 
Machinery                 47                4.6                2.1                  23.4                  34.0 
Measuring & Control Equip.                 17                1.7                1.4                  47.1                  58.8 
Medical Equipment                 31                3.1                2.6                  58.1                  61.3 
 Mining                 11                1.1                2.9                  27.3                  45.5 
Other                 11                1.1                2.3                  36.4                  72.7 
Personal Services                   5                0.5                0.8                  80.0                  80.0 
Petroleum and Natural Gas                 27                2.7                5.2                  40.7                  63.0 
Pharmaceutical Products                 65                6.4                5.9                  53.9                  53.9 
Printing and Publishing                 12                1.2                0.6                  58.3                  66.7 
Real Estate                 13                1.3                1.0                  15.4                  23.1 
Recreation                 10                1.0                0.5                  20.0                  20.0 
Restaraunts, Hotels, Motels                 38                3.8                1.1                  29.0                  44.7 
Retail                 81                8.0                3.1                  37.0                  46.9 
Rubber and Plastic Products                 10                1.0                0.6                  20.0                  20.0 
Shipbuilding, Railroad                   4                0.4                0.1                      -                        -   
Shipping Containers                   3                0.3                0.2                  66.7                100.0 
Steel Works Etc                 12                1.2                1.0                  33.3                  41.7 
Trading                 32                3.2              15.0                  31.3                  34.4 
Transportation                 18                1.8                2.3                  33.3                  38.9 
Utilities                   3                0.3                3.0                      -                        -   
Wholesale                 71                7.0                2.3                  12.7                  29.6 
Total1 1,014          100.0          97.7                             33.5                  45.6 
Industry 
%  of Firms 
Using Non-
EBIT(DA) 
Non-GAAP 
Earnings 
%  of Firms 
Using Any 
Non-GAAP 
Earnings
Percent of 
Compustat
Percent of 
Sample
Number of 
Firm Years
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Table 1 Continued 
Panel B.  Frequency of Disclosure of Non-GAAP Earnings by Year2 
Dependent Variable3
Number of Quarters
0 200 175 152 146 674 165 145 127 115 552
72.5 % 68.4 % 60.3 % 63.5 % 66.5 % 59.8 % 56.6 % 50.4 % 50.0 % 54.4 %
1 27 30 19 18 94 24 25 15 17 81
9.8 % 11.7 % 7.5 % 7.8 % 9.3 % 8.7 % 9.8 % 6.0 % 7.4 % 8.0 %
2 12 17 10 11 50 14 16 10 9 49
4.4 % 6.6 % 4.0 % 4.8 % 4.9 % 5.1 % 6.3 % 4.0 % 3.9 % 4.8 %
3 6 11 10 15 42 5 8 9 15 37
2.2 % 4.3 % 4.0 % 6.5 % 4.1 % 1.8 % 3.1 % 3.6 % 6.5 % 3.6 %
4 31 23 61 40 154 68 62 91 74 295
11.2 % 9.0 % 24.2 % 17.4 % 15.2 % 24.6 % 24.2 % 36.1 % 32.2 % 29.1 %
Total 276 256 252 230 1,014 276 256 252 230 1,014
Dependent Variable3
Number of Quarters
0 215 191 162 151 719 179 157 138 122 596
77.9 % 74.6 % 64.3 % 65.7 % 70.9 % 64.9 % 61.3 % 54.8 % 53.0 % 58.8 %
1 26 30 21 23 100 25 26 16 18 85
9.4 % 11.7 % 8.3 % 10.0 % 9.9 % 9.1 % 10.2 % 6.4 % 7.8 % 8.4 %
2 8 15 18 16 57 14 15 17 15 61
2.9 % 5.9 % 7.1 % 7.0 % 5.6 % 5.1 % 5.9 % 6.8 % 6.5 % 6.0 %
3 13 11 17 15 56 20 17 25 22 84
4.7 % 4.3 % 6.8 % 6.5 % 5.5 % 7.3 % 6.6 % 9.9 % 9.6 % 8.3 %
4 14 9 34 25 82 38 41 56 53 188
5.1 % 3.5 % 13.5 % 10.9 % 8.1 % 13.8 % 16.0 % 22.2 % 23.0 % 18.5 %
Total 276 256 252 230 1,014 276 256 252 230 1,014
2004 2005 2006 2007 Overall2004 2005 2006 2007 Overall
NPRF_EBNPRF
UPNPRF_EBUPNPRF
2004 2005 Overall20072006 2004 2005 2006 2007 Overall
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Note: 
1. Industry classification is based on the 49 industry definitions from the website of Kenneth R. French. Total percentage of Compustat does not add up to 100% 
because several industries are excluded from the table. None of the sample companies operates in the Agriculture sector (.26% of Compustat), Defense (.14%), 
Precious Metal (1.69%), Textiles (.17%), and Tobacco Products (.1%).  
2.  Numbers in integer represent the number of companies that do not disclose non-GAAP earnings in any quarters (number of quarters = 0) or disclose non-
GAAP earnings in one to four quarters of that year. Percentage is calculated by dividing each number by the number of observations of the year (i.e. the column 
total).  
3. NPRF is the number of quarters of a year in which a company discloses non-GAAP earnings which is not a variation of EBIT or EBITDA. NPRF_EB 
measures the number of quarters of a year in which a company discloses any non-GAAP earnings, including all variations of EBIT and EBITDA. UPNPRF is the 
number of quarters which non-GAAP earnings that are not EBIT or EBITDA are reported. UPNPRF_EB  is the number of quarters in which a company discloses 
any non-GAAP earnings that exceed the comparable reported GAAP measure, including all variations of EBIT and EBITDA.   
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Variable Correlations 
Panel A.  Descriptive Statistics (N=1,014) 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3
C_SCORE 0.13 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.22
OFFER 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00
COMP_STKBASE 0.29 0.34 0.00 0.10 0.58
COMP_UNEXOPT 3.24 8.41 0.02 0.74 2.95
COMP_OWN 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.09
IND 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00
LOGTA 6.36 2.26 4.39 6.47 8.15
PRF 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
PRF_EB 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
NPRF 0.93 1.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
NPRF_EB 1.45 1.78 0.00 0.00 4.00
UPPRF 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00
UPPRF_EB 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
NUPPRF 0.70 1.28 0.00 0.00 1.00
NUPPRF_EB 1.19 1.62 0.00 0.00 3.00
ACCCON 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00
 
Note: 
C_SCORE is a firm-year measure of conditional conservatism, or differential timeliness of earnings, 
devised by Khan and Watts (2009). OFFER equals one if a company receives proceeds from sale of stock 
(change in Compustat SSTKY since previous quarter) that is greater than one percent of beginning 
market value in a eight-quarter window surrounding the end of a fiscal year and zero otherwise. The eight 
quarters include the six quarters before and the two quarters after the fiscal year end. COMP_STKBASE is 
the percentage of CEO’s stock-based compensation, with the stock-based compensation calculated as the 
sum of the value of restricted stock granted and value realized from stock option exercises. Total 
compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive (or non-equity incentive) payout, change in 
pension value, all other compensation, and stock-based compensation. COMP_UNEXOPT is the sum of 
value of CEO’s unexercised exercisable and unexercisable stock options, scaled by the value of total 
compensation. COMP_OWN is CEO’s stock ownership (percent).  All compensation data are collected 
from annual proxy statements. LOGTA is the natural logarithm of the value of total assets (Compustat 
AT).  IND is an indicator variable coded as one for high-tech or service companies. Following Francis 
and Schipper (1999), companies with the following three-digit SIC code are classified as high-tech 
companies: 283, 357, 360-368, 481, 737, and 873. Service industries consist of four-digit SIC code 7000-
8999. PRF is a dummy variable coded as one if a company discloses non-GAAP earnings that are not a 
variation of EBIT or EBITDA in one or more quarters of the year, and zero otherwise. PRF_EB is a 
dummy variable coded as one if a company discloses non-GAAP earnings in one or more quarters of the 
year, and zero otherwise. NPRF is the number of quarters of a year in which a company discloses non-
GAAP earnings that are not a variation of EBIT or EBITDA. NPRF_EB is the number of quarters of a 
year in which a company discloses non-GAAP earnings. UPPRF is an indicator variable coded as one if a 
company discloses non-GAAP earnings, which are not a variation of EBIT or EBITDA, above the 
comparable reported GAAP measure, and zero otherwise. UPPRF_EB is an indicator variable coded as 
one if a company discloses non-GAAP earnings that exceed the comparable reported GAAP measure, and 
zero otherwise. ACCCON equals one if a company has negative discretionary accruals in the fiscal year 
while the annual market-adjusted return is negative in the corresponding year but non-negative in the 
previous year, and zero otherwise. Discretionary accruals are estimated using the modified Jones model. 
  
All continuous variables, except C_SCORE, are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. 
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Table 2 Continued 
Panel B.  Pearson (Upper Diagonal) and Spearman (Lower Diagonal) Correlation Coefficients (N=1,014) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0.102 -0.389 -0.171 0.287 -0.445 -0.083 -0.221 -0.125 -0.270 -0.119 -0.214 -0.118 -0.246 -0.091 -0.021
(0.0004) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 0.008 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (0.0038) (0.5048)
0.093 -0.066 -0.054 0.021 -0.223 0.072 -0.030 -0.022 -0.026 -0.021 -0.026 -0.016 -0.021 -0.015 -0.047
-0.003 -0.035 -0.085 -0.506 (<.0001) -0.022 -0.338 -0.475 -0.409 -0.496 -0.412 -0.617 -0.511 -0.626 -0.134
-0.408 -0.052 0.008 -0.282 0.472 -0.016 0.207 0.140 0.223 0.144 0.177 0.114 0.185 0.109 -0.023
(<.0001) -0.100 (0.8023) (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.605 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0003) (<.0001) (0.0005) (0.4565)
-0.439 -0.040 0.238 -0.040 0.084 0.067 0.031 0.032 0.048 0.031 0.019 0.009 0.038 0.019 0.010
(<.0001) -0.199 (<.0001) (0.205) (0.0073) -0.032 0.330 (0.3111) -0.123 (0.3219) (0.551) (0.7681) (0.2262) (0.5503) (0.7401)
0.428 0.065 -0.372 -0.189 -0.371 -0.032 -0.200 -0.196 -0.178 -0.173 -0.179 -0.167 -0.150 -0.147 -0.021
(<.0001) -0.040 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.314 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5047)
-0.506 -0.227 0.490 0.347 -0.576 -0.143 0.372 0.324 0.414 0.340 0.334 0.284 0.331 0.267 0.027
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3962)
-0.078 0.072 -0.034 0.074 0.034 -0.140 0.060 0.067 0.098 0.083 0.065 0.075 0.122 0.101 -0.012
-0.013 -0.022 -0.282 -0.019 -0.280 (<.0001) 0.055 -0.034 0.002 -0.008 -0.040 -0.017 (<.0001) -0.001 -0.712
-0.239 -0.030 0.208 0.190 -0.246 0.369 0.060 0.778 0.868 0.633 0.863 0.663 0.752 0.505 0.018
(<.0001) -0.338 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.055 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 0.570
-0.141 -0.022 0.134 0.136 -0.227 0.324 0.067 0.778 0.676 0.892 0.683 0.899 0.593 0.802 0.022
(<.0001) -0.475 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.034 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4895)
-0.270 -0.030 0.221 0.209 -0.252 0.401 0.079 0.976 0.759 0.715 0.817 0.623 0.890 0.583 0.023
(<.0001) -0.344 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.012 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 0.457
-0.138 -0.022 0.142 0.140 -0.217 0.343 0.080 0.704 0.956 0.733 0.610 0.873 0.645 0.923 0.025
(<.0001) -0.475 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.011 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4257)
-0.225 -0.026 0.183 0.143 -0.213 0.334 0.065 0.863 0.683 0.871 0.650 0.765 0.858 0.590 0.019
(<.0001) -0.412 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.040 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5493)
-0.126 -0.016 0.112 0.085 -0.181 0.287 0.075 0.663 0.899 0.667 0.902 0.765 0.656 0.883 0.021
(<.0001) -0.617 (0.0004) (0.0069) (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.017 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5081)
-0.245 -0.024 0.189 0.155 -0.212 0.345 0.087 0.852 0.673 0.888 0.668 0.982 0.751 0.674 0.006
(<.0001) -0.443 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.005 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.8575)
-0.112 -0.016 0.112 0.085 -0.167 0.286 0.092 0.588 0.868 0.617 0.925 0.682 0.960 0.706 0.015
(0.0004) -0.615 (0.0004) (0.0066) (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.003 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.6439)
-0.007 -0.047 -0.028 -0.002 0.007 0.029 -0.012 0.018 0.022 0.021 0.025 0.019 0.021 0.014 0.018
(0.8177) -0.134 (0.3798) (0.941) (0.8167) (0.3609) -0.712 -0.570 (0.4895) -0.514 (0.4306) (0.5493) (0.5081) (0.6454) (0.5626)
13. UPPRF_EB
14. NUPPRF
15. NUPPRF_EB
16. ACCCON
12. UPPRF
1. C_SCORE
2. OFFER
3. COMP_STKBASE
4. COMP_UNEXOPT
5. COMP_OWN
6. LOGTA
7. IND
8. PRF
9. PRF_EB
10. NPRF
11. NPRF_EB
 
Note: See Panel A for variable definitions. Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are shown above (below) the diagonal, with corresponding p-value 
reported in parentheses below each coefficient. Numbers in BOLD are significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 3 The Relation Between Conditional Conservatism and the Contracting Demand 
Panel A.  Descriptive Statistics (N=1,014) 
 
Variable
C_INDEX 0.34 - 8.39 - 0.02 - 0.06 - 0.15 -
Contract_Eq 0.69 0.65 0.14 0.15 0.60 0.56 0.71 0.68 0.80 0.76
Contract_Dbt 0.94 0.76 0.18 0.27 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.99
LIT -0.14 -0.18 1.09 0.67 -1.01 -0.69 0.04 -0.16 0.68 0.27
REG 0.40 0.62 0.49 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TAX 0.74 0.77 0.89 0.31 0.46 0.58 0.86 0.85 1.00 0.99
Statistics
Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3
Sample QiangSampleQiangSampleQiangSampleQiangSampleQiang
 
Note: C_INDEX is the amount of estimated reserves assuming capitalization of research and development expenditures (Compustat XRD), advertising expense 
(Compustat XAD), and LIFO reserve (Compustat LIFR) (Penman and Zhang 2002). The three items are assumed to be capitalized and amortized, using the sum 
of number’s digit method over a period of five years for R&D and two years for advertising expense. Each of the three items is deflated by net operating asset, as 
defined in Penman and Zhang (2002). Contract_Eq is the measure of equity contracting cost, proxied by the percentage of independent directors of the board. 
Contract_Dbt is the measure of debt contracting cost, measured as the percentage of private debt (Compustat DN+DCLO+DLTO) to total debt (Compustat 
DN+DD+DLTO+DCLO). LIT is the first factor derived using a principal component analysis based on five variables: equity beta, share turnover, market value, 
return skewness, and annual returns (see Qiang 2007 for detailed estimation). REG is an indicator variable coded as one if the amount of sales (Compustat SALE) 
divided by industry average sales (classified based on 2-digit SIC) is in the top quartile of all Compustat firms, and zero otherwise. TAX is the coefficient from 
the regression of income tax (Compustat TXT-TXDI) on tax expense (Compustat TXT), both scaled by beginning total asset (Compustat AT) using time-series 
data from current and previous nine years. C_SCORE is as defined in Panel A of Table 2. 
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Table 3 Continued 
Panel B.  Firm-Year Regression of Conservatism Measures on Proxies for Demand for Conservatism 
 
Variable
Intercept 0.183 7.10 *** 1.017 0.23
Contract_Eq -0.038 -1.23 -0.688 0.35
Contract_Dbt 0.021 1.39 0.218 0.57
LIT -0.038 -8.54 *** 0.190 0.33
REG -0.099 -8.71 *** -0.573 0.31
TAX -0.014 -2.46 ** -0.206 0.48
C_INDEX -0.001 -9.86 ***
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.00
N           1,014 1,014
Number of Clusters 610 610
Dependent Variable
C_SCORE C_INDEX
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
 
 
Note: Reported results are based on pooled OLS regressions with errors clustered at the firm level.  
 
***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3 Continued 
Panel C.  Regression of Conservatism Measures on Proxies for Demand for Conservatism Based On the Larger Sample 
 
Variable
Intercept 0.151 9.63 *** 0.536 1.11
Contract_Eq -0.035 -2.52 ** -0.229 -0.70
Contract_Dbt 0.037 3.39 *** 0.075 0.56
LIT -0.019 -9.12 *** 0.070 1.33
REG -0.055 -12.66 *** -0.217 -1.12
TAX -0.014 -2.85 *** -0.174 -0.71
C_INDEX -0.0005 -6.32 ***
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.00
N           2,676           2,676 
Number of Clusters           1,214           1,214 
Dependent Variable
C_SCORE C_INDEX
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
 
 
Note: Reported results are based on pooled OLS regressions with errors clustered at the firm level.  
 
***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  
 73 
 
73 
Table 4 Logistic Regression of Disclosure of Non-GAAP Earnings on C_SCORE and Valuation Focus Proxies 
Panel A.  Existence of Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure (N=1,014) 
 
Variable
Intercept -3.545 *** -3.652 *** -3.456 *** -3.509 *** -3.512 *** -3.398 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
C_SCORE -0.734 -0.326 0.075 -0.872 -0.780 -0.117
(0.499) (0.707) (0.933) (0.439) (0.359) (0.895)
OFFER 0.569 ** 0.598 ** 0.549 ** 0.539 ** 0.560 ** 0.514 **
(0.026) (0.020) (0.034) (0.033) (0.027) (0.042)
COMP -0.020 -0.008 -1.078 -0.079 -0.015 -0.539
(0.945) (0.405) (0.389) (0.796) (0.161) (0.670)
C_SCORE_OFFER -2.146 -2.193 * -1.955 -2.067 -2.207 * -1.921
(0.104) (0.091) (0.140) (0.125) (0.096) (0.162)
C_SCORE_COMP 1.922 0.057 -2.349 1.220 0.110 -4.912
(0.343) (0.404) (0.724) (0.570) (0.104) (0.508)
LOGTA 0.398 *** 0.413 *** 0.391 *** 0.366 *** 0.369 *** 0.351 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
IND 0.597 *** 0.600 *** 0.576 *** 0.586 *** 0.588 *** 0.557 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.156 0.159 0.131 0.132 0.134
Dependent Variable
PRF UPPRF
STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN
Compensation Measure (COMP_ ) Compensation Measure (COMP_ )
 
 
Note: See Panel A of Table 2 for variable definitions. Binomial logistic regressions are estimated. Reported p-values (in parentheses) based on Wald χ2 statistics 
are adjusted for correlation due to firms appearing in the sample in more than one year by clustering standard errors at the firm level. The number of observations 
is 1,014 and the number of clusters is 610 in all specifications. 
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***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  
 
 75 
 
75 
Table 4 Continued 
Panel B.  Number of Quarters of Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure (N=1,014) 
 
Variable
Intercept 1-4 N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R
C_SCORE -0.801 -0.580 -0.039 -1.259 -1.289 -0.380
(0.454) (0.484) (0.963) (0.264) (0.121) (0.654)
OFFER 0.653 *** 0.672 *** 0.640 *** 0.501 ** 0.509 ** 0.484 **
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.040) (0.038) (0.049)
COMP -0.026 -0.009 -0.211 -0.057 -0.016 0.449
(0.929) (0.337) (0.869) (0.853) (0.157) (0.747)
C_SCORE_OFFER -2.473 * -2.519 ** -2.353 * -1.802 -1.835 -1.675
(0.052) (0.044) (0.069) (0.189) (0.170) (0.233)
C_SCORE_COMP 1.478 0.093 -4.508 1.180 0.142 * -8.599
(0.456) (0.188) (0.519) (0.577) (0.077) (0.278)
LOGTA 0.440 *** 0.449 *** 0.437 *** 0.356 *** 0.357 *** 0.349 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
IND 0.741 *** 0.742 *** 0.720 *** 0.716 *** 0.716 *** 0.681 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.194 0.194 0.195 0.145 0.147 0.148
Dependent Variable
NPRF NUPPRF
STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN
Compensation Measure (COMP_ ) Compensation Measure (COMP_ )
  
 
Note: See Panel A of Table 2 for variable definitions. Ordered logistic regressions are estimated. For brevity the four intercepts are omitted from tabulations. 
Reported p-values (in parentheses) based on Wald χ2 statistics are adjusted for correlation due to firms appearing in the sample in more than one year by 
clustering standard errors at the firm level. The number of observations is 1,014 and the number of clusters is 610 in all specifications. 
 
***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4 Continued 
Panel C.  Existence of Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure, Including Additional Control Variables FOLLOW and NEGSURP (N=1,014) 
 
Variable
Intercept -3.932 *** -4.044 *** -3.860 *** -3.983 *** -4.005 *** -3.885 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
C_SCORE -0.966 -0.594 -0.201 -1.138 -1.087 -0.396
(0.413) (0.551) (0.843) (0.340) (0.263) (0.691)
OFFER 0.528 ** 0.563 ** 0.504 * 0.489 * 0.520 ** 0.461 *
(0.043) (0.030) (0.056) (0.060) (0.045) (0.078)
COMP 0.018 -0.008 -1.120 -0.037 -0.015 -0.566
(0.951) (0.416) (0.386) (0.903) (0.155) (0.665)
C_SCORE_OFFER -1.879 -1.939 -1.662 -1.750 -1.903 -1.581
(0.164) (0.141) (0.224) (0.214) (0.164) (0.273)
C_SCORE_COMP 2.028 0.070 -2.589 1.324 0.121 * -5.321
(0.316) (0.326) (0.707) (0.538) (0.077) (0.486)
LOGTA 0.366 *** 0.385 *** 0.367 *** 0.326 *** 0.334 *** 0.317 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
IND 0.513 *** 0.516 *** 0.499 *** 0.482 ** 0.483 ** 0.458 **
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
FOLLOW 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.015 0.014 0.014
(0.300) (0.316) (0.377) (0.184) (0.198) (0.223)
NEGSURP 0.712 *** 0.712 *** 0.721 *** 0.865 *** 0.873 *** 0.875 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Pseudo R2 0.174 0.173 0.177 0.155 0.157 0.158
OWN
Dependent Variable
PRF UPPRF
Compensation Measure (COMP_ ) Compensation Measure (COMP_ )
STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN STKBASE UNEXOPT
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Note: FOLLOW is the number of analysts following the company in the fiscal year (zero if the company is not covered by the I/B/E/S database). NEGSURP is an 
indicator variable coded as one when, in any of the four quarters,  reported GAAP earnings fall short of earnings of comparable quarter in the previous year and 
zero otherwise. Other variables are as defined in Panel A of Table 2. Binomial logistic regressions are estimated. Reported p-values (in parentheses) based on 
Wald χ2 statistics are adjusted for correlation due to firms appearing in the sample in more than one year by clustering standard errors at the firm level. The 
number of observations is 1,014 and the number of clusters is 610 in all specifications.   
 
***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4 Continued 
Panel D.  Existence of Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure, Including Additional Control Variables INST and NEGSURP (N=1,014) 
Variable
Intercept -4.185 *** -4.237 *** -4.142 *** -4.309 *** -4.250 *** -4.240 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
C_SCORE -0.980 -0.767 -0.358 -1.191 -1.363 -0.692
(0.379) (0.411) (0.707) (0.287) (0.128) (0.453)
OFFER 0.448 * 0.472 * 0.435 * 0.407 0.425 * 0.389
(0.081) (0.065) (0.095) (0.109) (0.093) (0.13)
COMP -0.049 -0.011 -0.554 -0.106 -0.018 0.011
(0.868) (0.273) (0.676) (0.728) (0.101) (0.994)
C_SCORE_OFFER -1.387 -1.473 -1.236 -1.200 -1.387 -1.094
(0.302) (0.262) (0.368) (0.391) (0.306) (0.452)
C_SCORE_COMP 1.447 0.086 -2.511 0.578 0.142 ** -4.806
(0.478) (0.22) (0.706) (0.79) (0.033) (0.523)
LOGTA 0.335 *** 0.338 *** 0.336 *** 0.301 *** 0.292 *** 0.295 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
IND 0.508 *** 0.507 *** 0.496 *** 0.483 ** 0.479 ** 0.464 **
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
INST 1.078 *** 1.135 *** 1.006 *** 1.195 *** 1.231 *** 1.108 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
NEGSURP 0.757 *** 0.763 *** 0.760 *** 0.917 *** 0.931 *** 0.920 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Pseudo R2 0.183 0.183 0.184 0.165 0.168 0.166
Dependent Variable
PRF UPPRF
STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN
Compensation Measure (COMP_ ) Compensation Measure (COMP_ )
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Note: INST is the percentage of institutional ownership. Other variables are as defined in Panel A of Table 2 and Panel C of Table 4. Binomial logistic 
regressions are estimated. Reported p-values (in parentheses) based on Wald χ2 statistics are adjusted for correlation due to firms appearing in the sample in more 
than one year by clustering standard errors at the firm level. Due to the availability of data on institutional ownership, the number of observations (firm clusters) 
is reduced to 976 (590) in all specifications.  
 
***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4 Continued 
Panel E.  Existence of Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure, Including Additional Control Variables FOLLOW and NEGFE (N=713) 
 
Variable
Intercept -3.924 *** -3.829 *** -3.828 *** -4.036 *** -3.869 *** -3.880 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
C_SCORE 0.331 -0.001 -0.272 -0.300 -0.788 -0.618
(0.797) (0.999) (0.798) (0.815) (0.420) (0.545)
OFFER 0.436 0.433 0.421 0.342 0.346 0.320
(0.115) (0.118) (0.132) (0.215) (0.208) (0.245)
COMP 0.018 -0.003 -1.189 -0.060 -0.010 -0.977
(0.953) (0.747) (0.407) (0.845) (0.398) (0.495)
C_SCORE_OFFER -0.564 -0.676 -0.525 -0.473 -0.745 -0.500
(0.703) (0.648) (0.720) (0.752) (0.619) (0.736)
C_SCORE_COMP -0.823 0.025 6.284 -0.827 0.087 2.119
(0.714) (0.696) (0.475) (0.707) (0.138) (0.826)
LOGTA 0.325 *** 0.317 *** 0.320 *** 0.235 *** 0.218 *** 0.218 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
IND 0.647 *** 0.643 *** 0.677 *** 0.551 ** 0.541 ** 0.557 **
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
FOLLOW 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.011
(0.601) (0.605) (0.662) (0.316) (0.334) (0.358)
NEGFE 1.094 *** 1.090 *** 1.109 *** 1.769 *** 1.762 *** 1.781 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Pseudo R2 0.121 0.121 0.122 0.140 0.141 0.140
Dependent Variable
PRF UPPRF
STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN
Compensation Measure (COMP_ ) Compensation Measure (COMP_ )
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Note: NEGFE is an indicator variable coded as one if, in any quarter of the fiscal year, the last consensus analyst EPS forecast is greater than the reported GAAP 
diluted EPS and zero otherwise. Other variables are as defined in Panel A of Table 2 and Panel C of Table 4. Binomial logistic regressions are estimated. 
Reported p-values (in parentheses) based on Wald χ2 statistics are adjusted for correlation due to firms appearing in the sample in more than one year by 
clustering standard errors at the firm level. Due to the availability of I/B/E/S data on analyst forecasts, the number of observations (firm clusters) is reduced to 
713 (445) in all specifications. 
 
 ***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5 Regression of Disclosure of Non-GAAP Earnings on Contracting Cost and Valuation Proxies 
 
Variable
Intercept -6.061 *** -6.072 *** -5.268 *** -5.984 *** -5.975 *** -5.597 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Contract_Eq 1.857 ** 1.008 0.863 1.601 * 1.266 * 1.070
(0.033) (0.141) (0.244) (0.069) (0.067) (0.145)
Contract_Dbt 0.800 1.381 0.902 0.835 1.083 1.015
(0.400) (0.138) (0.254) (0.419) (0.277) (0.211)
OFFER 0.695 0.803 0.950 0.661 0.638 0.771
(0.571) (0.522) (0.462) (0.613) (0.643) (0.579)
COMP 0.698 0.036 -10.941 -0.204 -0.065 -6.882
(0.698) (0.790) (0.358) (0.919) (0.746) (0.519)
Contract_Eq_OFFER 0.639 0.744 0.669 0.338 0.348 0.326
(0.606) (0.547) (0.595) (0.785) (0.780) (0.797)
Contract_Dbt_OFFER -0.872 -1.041 -1.172 -0.635 -0.620 -0.762
(0.350) (0.281) (0.249) (0.528) (0.566) (0.479)
Contract_Eq_COMP -1.831 0.049 2.084 -0.767 0.006 1.066
(0.245) (0.494) (0.706) (0.621) (0.924) (0.854)
Contract_Dbt_COMP 0.826 -0.069 8.286 0.876 0.056 4.988
(0.560) (0.595) (0.476) (0.594) (0.773) (0.628)
LOGTA 0.352 *** 0.364 *** 0.346 *** 0.307 *** 0.311 *** 0.298 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
IND 0.460 ** 0.469 ** 0.474 ** 0.440 ** 0.446 ** 0.447 **
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024)
FOLLOW 0.018 * 0.019 * 0.017 0.023 ** 0.024 ** 0.021 **
(0.088) (0.077) (0.111) (0.020) (0.016) (0.030)
NEGSURP 0.669 *** 0.671 *** 0.683 *** 0.804 *** 0.794 *** 0.818 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Pseudo R2 0.180 0.179 0.182 0.160 0.160 0.162
Dependent Variable
PRF UPPRF
STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN
Compensation Measure (COMP_ ) Compensation Measure (COMP_ )
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Note:  
Contract_Eq is the measure of equity contracting cost, proxied by the percentage of independent directors of the board. Contract_Dbt is the measure of debt 
contracting cost, measured as the percentage of private debt (Compustat DN+DCLO+DLTO) to total debt (Compustat DN+DD+DLTO+DCLO). FOLLOW is the 
number of analysts following the company in the fiscal year (zero if the company is not covered by the I/B/E/S database). NEGSURP is an indicator variable 
coded as one when, in any of the four quarters,  reported GAAP earnings fall short of earnings of comparable quarter in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
Other variables are as defined in Panel A of Table 2 and Panel C of Table 4.  
 
Binomial logistic regressions are estimated. Reported p-values (in parentheses) based on Wald χ2 statistics are adjusted for correlation due to firms appearing in 
the sample in more than one year by clustering standard errors at the firm level. The number of observations is 1,014 and the number of clusters is 610 in all 
specifications. 
 
***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6 Logistic Regressions Incorporating Further Evidence of Timely Loss Recognition 
Panel A.  Reduced Sample with Consistent Classifications (N=515) 
 
Variable
Intercept -4.426 *** -4.424 *** -4.290 *** -4.481 *** -4.298 *** -4.221 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
C_SCORE -1.325 -0.655 0.480 0.000 -1.148 0.046
(0.576) (0.732) (0.812) (1.000) (0.561) (0.982)
OFFER 0.658 ** 0.702 ** 0.657 ** 0.807 *** 0.803 *** 0.753 **
(0.025) (0.016) (0.026) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
COMP 0.137 -0.008 -1.360 0.054 -0.013 -1.254
(0.684) (0.507) (0.290) (0.874) (0.258) (0.379)
C_SCORE_OFFER -4.867 -5.208 -5.357 -5.390 -5.699 -5.567
(0.146) (0.109) (0.110) (0.126) (0.110) (0.123)
C_SCORE_COMP 3.009 0.076 -12.270 -2.304 0.132 -11.346
(0.467) (0.581) (0.307) (0.603) (0.284) (0.361)
LOGTA 0.426 *** 0.438 *** 0.427 *** 0.393 *** 0.378 *** 0.371 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
IND 0.762 *** 0.776 *** 0.792 *** 0.652 ** 0.630 ** 0.651 **
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
FOLLOW 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.008 0.006
(0.888) (0.883) (0.972) (0.588) (0.523) (0.660)
NEGSURP 0.852 *** 0.835 *** 0.860 *** 0.861 *** 0.870 *** 0.888 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Pseudo R2 0.172 0.171 0.174 0.158 0.160 0.161
OWN
Dependent Variable
PRF UPPRF
Compensation Measure (COMP_ ) Compensation Measure (COMP_ )
STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN STKBASE UNEXOPT
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Note: See Panel A of Table 2 and Panel C of Table 4 for variable definitions. Binomial logistic regressions are estimated. Reported p-values (in parentheses) 
based on Wald χ2 statistics are adjusted for correlation due to firms appearing in the sample in more than one year by clustering standard errors at the firm level. 
The number of observations is 515 and the number of clusters is 355 in all specifications.   
 
***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
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Table 6 Continued 
Panel B.  ACCCON as the Measure of Conditional Conservatism (N=1,014) 
 
Variable
Intercept -4.197 *** -4.117 *** -3.858 *** -4.292 *** -4.167 *** -3.940 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
ACCCON 0.397 0.108 0.082 0.668 * 0.296 0.075
(0.218) (0.707) (0.777) (0.051) (0.313) (0.801)
OFFER 0.348 * 0.347 * 0.325 * 0.397 ** 0.390 ** 0.376 **
(0.058) (0.056) (0.073) (0.039) (0.039) (0.048)
COMP 0.331 -0.001 -1.674 * 0.270 -0.003 -1.783 *
(0.205) (0.886) (0.080) (0.327) (0.736) (0.096)
ACCCON_OFFER -0.610 -0.613 -0.590 -1.515 * -1.602 * -1.490 *
(0.272) (0.305) (0.315) (0.051) (0.063) (0.068)
ACCCON_COMP -1.020 -0.009 -0.274 -1.480 ** -0.024 2.152
(0.128) (0.622) (0.905) (0.036) (0.401) (0.298)
LOGTA 0.368 *** 0.373 *** 0.354 *** 0.322 *** 0.320 *** 0.306 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
IND 0.530 *** 0.530 *** 0.514 *** 0.500 ** 0.498 ** 0.472 **
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016)
FOLLOW 0.017 0.019 * 0.016 0.022 ** 0.024 ** 0.021 **
(0.112) (0.082) (0.139) (0.027) (0.018) (0.038)
NEGSURP 0.701 *** 0.666 *** 0.695 *** 0.834 *** 0.792 *** 0.826 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Pseudo R2 0.173 0.170 0.174 0.159 0.156 0.159
Dependent Variable
PRF UPPRF
STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN
Compensation Measure (COMP_ ) Compensation Measure (COMP_ )
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Note: ACCCON equals one if a company has negative discretionary accruals in the fiscal year while the annual market-adjusted return is negative in the 
corresponding year but non-negative in the previous year, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined as in Panel A of Table 2 and Panel C of Table 4. 
Binomial logistic regressions are estimated. Reported p-values (in parentheses) based on Wald χ2 statistics are adjusted for correlation due to firms appearing in 
the sample in more than one year by clustering standard errors at the firm level. The number of observations is 1,014 and the number of clusters is 610 in all 
specifications.   
 
***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
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Table 7 Logistic Regressions Using Alternative Measures of Conservatism 
Panel A.  Callen et al.’s Conservatism Ratio (CR) (N=601) 
 
Variable
Intercept -4.354 *** -4.337 *** -4.163 *** -4.454 *** -4.408 *** -4.213 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
CR 0.055 0.055 -0.113 0.052 0.054 -0.078
(0.448) (0.456) (0.181) (0.460) (0.454) (0.325)
OFFER 0.446 0.444 0.434 0.755 ** 0.707 ** 0.683 **
(0.150) (0.141) (0.143) (0.019) (0.025) (0.027)
COMP 0.519 0.004 -1.915 0.216 -0.016 -2.198
(0.189) (0.875) (0.123) (0.602) (0.517) (0.112)
CR_OFFER -0.360 -0.332 -0.329 -0.763 -0.665 -0.630
(0.515) (0.534) (0.531) (0.175) (0.233) (0.246)
CR_COMP -0.010 -0.022 1.750 ** 0.446 0.007 1.376 **
(0.986) (0.565) (0.049) (0.422) (0.866) (0.045)
LOGTA 0.393 *** 0.412 *** 0.408 *** 0.358 *** 0.371 *** 0.362 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
IND 0.534 ** 0.567 ** 0.564 ** 0.406 * 0.454 * 0.450 *
(0.025) (0.016) (0.017) (0.095) (0.055) (0.058)
FOLLOW 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.015 0.019 0.015
(0.322) (0.212) (0.303) (0.209) (0.113) (0.206)
NEGSURP 0.847 *** 0.797 *** 0.825 *** 1.042 *** 0.997 *** 1.038 ***
(<.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Pseudo R2 0.185 0.182 0.187 0.172 0.169 0.174
Dependent Variable
PRF UPPRF
STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN
Compensation Measure (COMP_ ) Compensation Measure (COMP_ )
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Table 7 Continued 
Panel B.  Givoly and Hayn’s Cumulative Nonoperating Accruals (NOPACC) (N=506) 
 
Variable
Intercept -4.211 *** -4.400 *** -3.703 *** -3.781 *** -3.919 *** -3.030 ***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
NOPACC 0.818 1.656 1.405 1.469 2.510 2.191
(0.690) (0.318) (0.370) (0.497) (0.140) (0.191)
OFFER 0.383 0.475 * 0.374 0.598 ** 0.675 *** 0.582 **
(0.148) (0.071) (0.154) (0.021) (0.009) (0.026)
COMP 0.352 0.027 * -3.866 ** 0.313 0.017 -6.352 ***
(0.375) (0.071) (0.018) (0.440) (0.224) (0.000)
NOPACC_OFFER -1.984 -2.362 -1.793 -3.193 -3.561 -3.174
(0.392) (0.263) (0.423) (0.200) (0.129) (0.201)
NOPACC_COMP 0.790 -0.050 -3.017 1.479 -0.039 1.815
(0.811) (0.782) (0.791) (0.658) (0.851) (0.877)
LOGTA 0.373 *** 0.396 *** 0.354 *** 0.228 ** 0.247 *** 0.188 **
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.013) (0.005) (0.032)
IND 0.456 0.428 0.432 0.179 0.173 0.142
(0.120) (0.138) (0.143) (0.563) (0.568) (0.645)
FOLLOW 0.019 0.019 0.014 0.037 ** 0.037 ** 0.031 **
(0.221) (0.205) (0.351) (0.012) (0.010) (0.033)
NEGSURP 0.357 0.390 * 0.403 * 0.411 0.428 * 0.474 *
(0.126) (0.095) (0.083) (0.103) (0.090) (0.057)
Pseudo R2 0.194 0.197 0.207 0.160 0.160 0.183
Dependent Variable
PRF UPPRF
STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN STKBASE UNEXOPT OWN
Compensation Measure (COMP_ ) Compensation Measure (COMP_ )
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Note: CR is the conservatism ratio proposed by Callen et al. (2010). See the Appendix for how CR is estimated.  Following Callen et al., only observations with 
non-negative value of CR are retained in the analysis.  NOPACC is calculated as (-1)*cumulative nonoperating accruals, scaled by beginning total assets 
(Compustat AT). Cumulative nonoperating accruals are calculated as: net income (Compustat NI) + depreciation (Compustat DP) - cash flows from operations 
(Compustat OANCF) - (∆Accounts Receivable (change in Compustat RECT) + ∆Inventories (change in Compustat INVT) +∆Prepaid Expenses (change in 
Compustat XPP) - ∆Accounts Payable (change in Compustat AP) -∆Taxes Payable (change in Compustat TXP)).  Other variables are as defined in Panel A of 
Table 2 and Panel C of Table 4. Binomial logistic regressions are estimated. Reported p-values (in parentheses) based on Wald χ2 statistics are adjusted for 
correlation due to firms appearing in the sample in more than one year by clustering standard errors at the firm level. The number of observations is 601 (506) 
and the number of clusters is 394(300) in the models in which CR (NOPACC) is used as the measure of conditional conservatism. 
   
***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
